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Thirty years ago, China began implementing a series of reforms to improve efﬁ  ciency 
in agricultural production.  These, and subsequent, reforms reshaped China’s position 
in the world economy.  China’s rapid economic development and transformation from a 
planned to a market-oriented economy, however, has reached a stage where further efﬁ  -
ciency gains in agricultural production will likely hinge on the development of modern 
market-supporting institutions.  The development of market-supporting institutions in 
China will bring about long-term and sustainable beneﬁ  ts to producers and consumers in 
China and the global agricultural economy.  This report provides an overview of current 
issues in China’s agricultural development, policy responses to these issues, and the 
effects of these policies on China’s growing role in international markets.
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Summary
China is the world’s largest agricultural economy, producing and consuming 
a wide range of agricultural products. This report summarizes China’s agri-
cultural development over the past 30 years, the challenges facing China’s 
agricultural economy, the role policy plays in addressing the needs of this 
developing agricultural system, and how economics and policies interact to 
affect trade in agricultural products.   
What Is the Issue?
As the world’s largest agricultural economy and an important player in 
world agricultural markets, China’s role in international agricultural trade 
has implications for agricultural producers, consumers, and policymakers in 
the United States. While the establishment of markets for agricultural inputs 
and outputs has helped China raise agricultural production over the last 30 
years, the country faces several issues that will be more difﬁ  cult to resolve.  
China is currently struggling to manage stressed land and water resources, 
to develop modern marketing institutions and infrastructure, to boost rural 
incomes to keep pace with urban incomes, and to develop or adapt agricul-
tural technologies.  
What Did the Study Find?
Since adopting market-based reforms 30 years ago, China’s ability to meet its 
food and agricultural needs has exceeded the expectations of most observers. 
Domestic production has satisﬁ  ed most of the growing food demands of 
China’s increasingly afﬂ  uent population. As China established and developed 
markets, farmers diversiﬁ  ed into livestock, aquaculture, and fruit and vege-
table production while simultaneously increasing production of staple grains.  
In addition, millions of rural workers shifted out of agriculture to provide 
manpower for China’s broader economic resurgence.
The enormous across-the-board increases in production suggest that China 
was far below its production potential before it adopted market reforms.  
Allowing farmers to produce according to market incentives and relaxing 
production quotas and restraints on inter-regional trade enabled China’s 
farmers to use resources more efﬁ  ciently, to raise productivity, and to reduce 
waste.  Today, nearly all farm commodities and inputs are traded at market 
prices.
Agricultural productivity growth in China has slowed in recent years, 
suggesting that China’s potential for achieving efﬁ  ciency gains from market-
based reforms is diminishing.  Chinese agriculture also faces stiff challenges 
in allocating scarce natural resources and integrating small farms, which still 
largely use hand-held tools, into modern, global agricultural markets.  Many 
of these challenges stem from carryovers of the collective period, such as 
collective land ownership, interventionist Government policies, or underde-
veloped institutions to enforce property rights and settle land disputes.  
China has the potential to achieve further efﬁ  ciency gains; to do so, however, 
it must navigate another round of reforms addressing issues such as:iv
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Land Tenure: Collective ownership of farmland and its allocation by village 
ofﬁ  cials has led to tiny plots that increase the cost of production, increase 
the cost of establishing modern marketing institutions and traceability, and 
diminish incentives to adopt modern technologies.  Collective management, 
along with poorly deﬁ  ned and enforced rights to farmland, also diminishes 
incentives to engage in conservation practices and reduces farmers’ share of 
the wealth generated by economic development. 
 Marketing Practices: It is difﬁ  cult to regulate or monitor China’s frag-
mented and scattered farms, wholesalers, and input suppliers.  Small-scale 
production and marketing also impede China’s ability to improve food safety 
and quality (features in high demand in China’s wealthier urban areas) in 
its rapidly growing food processing industries and in its expanding export 
markets.  
Rural Income Growth: While rural incomes in China were the ﬁ  rst to beneﬁ  t 
from reforms, they have lagged behind urban income growth since the early 
1990s.  China has established many policies to increase rural incomes and 
promote rural development, including eliminating agricultural taxes and 
fees, establishing direct subsidies, input subsidies, and price supports, and 
reforming rural credit institutions with a focus on rural lending.  
Agricultural Technology Development and Adoption:  Productivity growth 
in China over the last 30 years beneﬁ  ted greatly from advances in plant and 
animal breeding, but there is still ample capacity to improve yields and other 
crop characteristics through continued research and extension.  China’s 
research system is dominated by public research institutions.  Domestic 
private seed companies—most of them small scale—have limited capacity to 
engage in private research. Weak enforcement of intellectual property rights 
reduces private incentives to develop and market new seed varieties.  
Future Role in International Markets:  The extent and nature of China’s 
agricultural trade will depend on fundamental economic forces and how 
effectively China addresses land tenure, marketing practices, rural income, 
and agricultural technology issues.  As income growth and urbanization 
reduce demand growth for food grains, potential rice and wheat produc-
tivity increases may help China maintain near self-sufﬁ  ciency.  China will 
continue to increase production of fruit, vegetable, and livestock products, 
with most of this production consumed by the more prosperous consumers 
in China—so long as they can be assured of its safety and quality.  Exports 
of these products will also grow if China effectively addresses those same 
safety, quality, and consistency issues.  China will continue to be a major 
importer of oilseeds to meet the growing domestic demand for high-quality 
vegetable oils and high-protein livestock feed additives and may also become 
an importer of corn as domestic demand for livestock products grows.  
Demand for cotton and hide imports has boomed as China’s exports of 
textiles, clothing, and shoes have expanded, but future export growth may be 
dampened by appreciation of China’s currency, rising labor costs, and slower 
growth in world demand.v
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How Was the Study Conducted?
This report is a synthesis of past research ﬁ  ndings from studies conducted by 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service and other 
research organizations.  It builds upon the various ﬁ  ndings by providing a 
common theme to understand China’s current state of economic develop-
ment, the role of agriculture, and the nature of policies and institutions 
affecting China’s production, consumption, and trade.vi
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Introduction  
A visitor to China today would have a hard time imagining what the country 
was like before reforms that began reshaping the agricultural landscape 30 
years ago.  China in the 1970s was poor and isolated.  Rural workers toiled 
on collectively owned farms in teams directed by local ofﬁ  cials.  Industrial 
workers staffed large State-owned enterprises where output targets and prices 
were determined by central planners.  Each region and city was expected to 
be largely self-sufﬁ  cient in production of most goods.  State-run marketing 
companies, subject to the decree of central planners, were in charge of the 
limited trade between the regions that existed.  There was little private 
economic activity at this time, and millions of people survived on a diet of 
less than 2,000 calories per day.  
Today, China is one of the world’s largest economies, a major importer and 
exporter, and a sought-after location for multinational ﬁ  rms.  Rural workers 
raise a variety of crops on individually managed plots, engage in household 
livestock and sideline production, and travel all over the country to work 
in thriving industrial and service sectors.  Most manufactured goods are 
produced in coastal areas and marketed throughout the country.  The State-
owned sector represents only about a third of economic output, and many 
remaining State-owned ﬁ  rms raise capital on stock markets and have joint 
ventures with foreign ﬁ  rms.  Urban workers frequently change jobs, buy 
much of their food in modern supermarkets and convenience stores, and 
frequently dine in restaurants. Obesity has become a major public health 
issue.
Agricultural reforms played an important role in China’s economic 
resurgence over the past three decades (Rozelle and Swinnen, 2004).  
Re-establishing household agricultural production was the spark that ignited 
the process of establishing markets and relinquishing direct Government 
control over the economy.  Responding to these changes, farmers immedi-
ately boosted rural incomes, lifted millions out of poverty, and improved 
the diets of Chinese citizens.  By the 1990s, similar reforms took hold in the 
urban and industrial sectors, and their growth began to outpace agricultural 
and rural growth.  But agriculture continued to play a critical economic role 
by meeting the growing demands of wealthier, mostly urban, consumers for 
fruit, vegetable, and livestock products as well as traditional staple grains.  
A seemingly endless supply of inexpensive labor released from collective 
agriculture fueled China’s booming manufacturing and urban construction 
sectors.
China is currently the world’s largest agricultural economy and a leading 
importer and exporter of agricultural products.  China’s agricultural sector, 
however, is still changing as it responds to the rising and increasingly sophis-
ticated demands of domestic and foreign consumers, adapts small-scale farm 
structure to global food markets, and competes with other sectors for labor, 
investment capital, and scarce land and water resources (Gale et al., 2002; 
Lohmar and Gale, 2008).  While China has come a long way in its transi-
tion to a market economy, it still retains many of the institutional vestiges 
of the planned economy.  Nearly all ﬁ  nal products are bought and sold at 
market prices, but collective land ownership, ambiguous water rights, and 2
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weak legal and ﬁ  nancial systems confound market-driven resource adjust-
ments, farm consolidations, and agricultural investment.  In the absence of 
well-functioning market-supporting institutions, Chinese economic planners 
gravitate toward interventionist policies to resolve market failures.  This, in 
turn, reduces the demand for market-supporting institutions that could resolve 
these issues in a more market-oriented and sustainable way.  The path China 
takes and the policies chosen to address these issues will affect its longrun 
capacity to resolve them effectively.
Understanding China’s recent historical development is critical to assessing 
the implications for China’s role in world agricultural markets.  The develop-
ment of markets over the last 30 years, the remaining role of Government, 
and the emergence of market-supporting institutions are key issues under-
lying the evolution of China’s agricultural economy.  An assessment of 
critical issues facing China’s agricultural economy—management of land 
and water resources, development of modern marketing chains, provision of 
food safety assurances, lagging rural incomes, and technology development 
and extension—illustrates how rapid economic growth is creating tensions 
stemming from the institutional legacy of the planned economy.  How each 
of these issues is resolved will have important implications for China’s future 
agricultural production, consumption, and trade.3
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Background:  
China’s Economic Development 
and Implications for Agriculture
At the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949, China was still an 
agricultural economy in an industrializing and urbanizing world.  By the late 
1950s, China’s leaders sought to catapult the semifeudal economy into the 
industrialized 20th century.  Part of the plan relied on adapting Soviet-style 
collective agriculture to China by organizing hundreds of millions of farmers 
into a hierarchy of about 24,000 “Peoples Communes.”1  Except for limited 
cash crop production on small plots of land near individual households in 
some areas, all agricultural production decisions were made by local leaders 
in accordance with a production plan established by higher level leaders.  
Local leaders were obligated to deliver their quota of agricultural production 
to local stations run by State-owned marketing bureaus.  Marketing bureaus 
made planned transfers of products from surplus to deﬁ  cit areas at prices 
determined by the central Government.  Agricultural prices were set low and 
industrial prices high to extract resources from agriculture to invest in urban 
and industrial development.
The Reform Period, 1978-2008
The Household Responsibility System (HRS)  
When reform-minded leaders came to power in 1978, China began moving 
away from collective agriculture.  Under a new policy, the Household 
Responsibility System (HRS), villages divided up collectively owned land 
and leased it to individual households to farm.  In lieu of rent, farm house-
holds were obligated to deliver a ﬁ  xed quota of their production of “stra-
tegic crops” to the State and the farm households were paid a predetermined 
price.2  While many areas preserved elements of collective agriculture, and 
some villages required that certain strategic crops be produced on a portion 
of village land, households were largely free to farm the land as they saw ﬁ  t 
and any production beyond the quota was theirs to consume or sell.  Most 
importantly, farmers could produce cash crops and livestock products and 
sell their surpluses in rural markets.  To provide opportunities for farmers 
to market their products, traditional rural markets were re-established 
throughout the countryside, and free markets were re-established in urban 
areas.3
Re-establishing household agricultural production autonomy and indepen-
dent markets for agricultural products was the initial step in China’s transi-
tion toward a market-based economy and rapid economic growth.  Farmers 
were the ﬁ  rst to beneﬁ  t.  Freed from the constraints of collective work teams 
and lured by high market prices, farm households shifted land and labor 
effort from grain production to cash crops and livestock production.  Despite 
the shift in resources and effort, grain production rose because farmers allo-
cated resources more efﬁ  ciently than central planners.  Cash crop and live-
stock production also boomed.  Income from nonagricultural sources began 
to grow after reforms as rural households allocated labor to small household 
enterprises, expanding rural industry (known as “township and village enter-
1 The hierarchy in the collective period 
was Commune-Brigade-Production 
Team, and these correspond roughly 
with today’s Township-Village-Xiaozu 
(team).
2 Strategic crops included grains, 
oilseeds, and cotton, but farmers were 
primarily obligated to deliver grain 
quotas, as well as quotas for cotton 
and oilseeds in some areas.
3 Traditional rural and urban markets 
were largely shut down during the 
collective period, except for a brief 
re-emergence in 1962-65.4
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prises” or TVEs).  As urban job opportunities grew, migration to urban areas 
offered another alternative to farmwork.
Marketing Reform  
Initial restrictions on marketing activity were eventually relaxed and inter-
regional markets developed throughout the reform period.  More liberal 
policies were intermittently reversed when they were blamed for bursts of 
inﬂ  ation and perceived grain shortages.  Once private trading networks arose, 
however, they were hard to rein in.  By the end of the 1990s, the expansion 
of traders, greater marketing freedoms for private traders, and investments 
into transportation and communication infrastructure led to the integration of 
domestic markets.  As marketing shifted to the private sector, Government 
marketing bureaus lost money because they lacked strong incentives to 
improve efﬁ  ciency and were burdened with employment and other require-
ments imposed upon them, ultimately requiring Government subsidies.  
Many marketing bureaus were ultimately privatized and transformed into 
commercial agribusinesses.
Industrial Reform  
By the late 1980s, China’s urban industrial economy began to blossom under 
reforms similar to those applied to agriculture:  managers of State-owned 
companies were given more decisionmaking autonomy.  Inefﬁ  cient compa-
nies were merged with more efﬁ  cient ones or shut down entirely.  Moreover, 
the State-owned industrial sector had to compete with the more efﬁ  cient rural 
industrial sector that rose up in the 1980s and the foreign direct-invested 
enterprises from the 1990s.  To fuel the subsequent growth in urban and 
industrial areas, restrictions on labor movement were relaxed, or less vigor-
ously enforced, so that rural workers could staff the growing ranks of indus-
trial enterprises, urban construction projects, or take other jobs in urban 
areas.4
Trade Reform  
To complement reforms to domestic production and marketing, China also 
liberalized trade policies to become more integrated with the world economy.  
Agricultural trade was long dominated by State-owned trading enterprises, 
monopolies for strategic products that imported and exported at the behest of 
State planners.  For the most part, China sought to maintain self-sufﬁ  ciency 
in agriculture, particularly for strategic products.  Throughout the 1990s, 
however, China lowered tariffs and other trade barriers to many agricultural 
products.  By the end of the 1990s, China had rescinded State-trading compa-
nies’ monopolies on the import and export of some strategic products, such 
as soybeans and cotton. In December 2001, China became a member of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), which lowered tariffs further, ended the 
remaining State monopolies on imports and exports of agricultural products, 
and locked in an open trade regime along with the reformed economic poli-
cies (Lohmar, Hansen, Seeley, and Hsu, 2002).5   
4 Many took jobs in the burgeoning 
service sector, such as in restaurants or 
transportation jobs, for which data are 
not well captured and almost certainly 
underestimated in ofﬁ  cial economic 
statistics.
5 Government-owned trading enter-
prises still wield signiﬁ  cant inﬂ  uence 
in some crops, such as wheat and corn. 5
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The Effect on Agriculture
China’s agricultural sector is key to the country’s astounding growth (Shane 
and Gale, 2004). Pre-1978 policies built up a reservoir of underutilized 
human resources in rural China with bans on labor movement and entrepre-
neurial activity, low farm prices, and farmer income not inﬂ  uenced by effort 
or output.  In most countries, the share of population employed in agriculture 
plunged during the 20th century, but in China over 70 percent of workers 
were employed in agriculture in the late 1970s. Decollectivization released 
a ﬂ  ood of rural workers, fueling industrial growth while simultaneously 
boosting agricultural production to meet the food needs of a large population 
with rising living standards.
Production  
China’s agricultural production grew continually over the reform period 
despite competition for resources, particularly labor, from faster growing 
sectors of the economy and competition from imports as trade policies 
were liberalized.  After reforms, grain production (rice, wheat, and corn) 
jumped from 247 million metric tons (mmt) in 1978 to 339 mmt in 1984 and 
exceeded 470 mmt in 2008 (ﬁ  g. 1).6  Corn production grew faster than other 
grains to maintain exports for hard currency and to feed the growing live-
stock sector.  Livestock production increased in the reform period, primarily 
for meat (mostly pork) and eggs, but in recent years, dairy production has 
taken off (ﬁ  g. 2).  For many products, China’s share of world production 
exceeds its share of world agricultural land and, for some products, its share 
of world production exceeds its share of world population (ﬁ  g. 3).
China’s agricultural production comes almost entirely from small-scale oper-
ations.  According to China’s 2007 agricultural census, the country has 200 
million farm households and an estimated 122 million hectares (494 million 
acres) of cultivated land—an average of 0.6 hectare (1.5 acres) per house-
Figure 1








1978           1983           1988            1993            1998            2003          2008
Source: China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) data.
Rice          Wheat          Corn
6 Rice volume is reported in unmilled 
weight. Rice loses approximately 30 
percent of its weight in the milling 
process.6
China’s Ongoing Agricultural Modernization: Challenges Remain After 30 Years of Reform / EIB-51
Economic Research Service/USDA
Figure 2
Indexes of grain and meat production, China, 1985-2008
Index (1985=100)
1985              1989              1993              1997              2001               2007
Source: China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) data.
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hold.  These small land holdings are typically divided into several noncon-
tiguous parcels (see, Land on page 14).  To coax production out of such small 
plots, farm households engage in intensive agricultural practices, including 
high levels of fertilizer application and raising two or three crops per year on 
a single plot (ﬁ  g. 4).  China also relies heavily on irrigation to boost yields, 
with nearly 50 percent of its land supporting irrigation delivery facilities and 
extensive irrigation in the more arid, northern part of the country.  The many 
crop varieties developed by China’s agricultural research institutes produce 
high yields with irrigation and fertilizer inputs. Some varieties are bred for a 
short growing season to facilitate multiple-cropping.
Figure 3
China’s estimated world shares of agricultural production, 2005
Percent
*Source: Food and Agriculture Organizaion data.
Source: Economic Research Service calculations based on USDA data (except where noted).
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Markets for inputs are largely free and lightly regulated.7  Seeds are supplied 
by thousands of small seed companies that often repackage seed purchased in 
bulk and then sell under their own label through small seed and input supply 
stores located in villages and townships throughout the countryside.  The 
pesticide industry is similarly atomized and difﬁ  cult to regulate.  Fertilizer 
is typically supplied by larger companies, but is frequently sold by private 
traders with shops in the county seat, rural townships, and villages or by itin-
erant traders who visit villages and sell from the back of their trucks.  The 
widespread sale of counterfeit, adulterated, and poor quality farm chemicals, 
feeds, and veterinary drugs is a major concern for China’s agricultural and 
commerce ofﬁ  cials. 
Marketing 
State-owned marketing bureaus no longer monopolize agricultural 
marketing.  Many of the marketing bureaus were reborn as agribusiness 
companies or semiofﬁ  cial “industry associations.”  Grain marketing includes 
small private traders and agribusinesses, as well as local and State govern-
ment-owned companies.   For grains, State marketing companies compete 
directly with private traders, but have preferred access to Government-
owned storage facilities and also are charged with purchasing grain under 
recently established price support programs.8  Market reports indicated that 
State-owned enterprises implementing a Government price support program 
accounted for 70 percent of rice purchases in late 2008. Recent surveys show 
that grain marketing channels vary from region to region.  Many farmers 
prefer to sell grain to small traders who come into villages to pick up grain, 
saving them time and transportation costs.  In some regions, large feed mills 
or food processors are the main purchasers.
Most horticultural and livestock products are marketed by a vast army of 
small traders and private marketing companies that sprang up as the produc-
tion of these products grew (Huang, Otsuka, and Rozelle, 2008).  Produce 
Figure 4
Indexes of agricultural use, China, 1985-2007
Index (1985=100)
1985              1989              1993              1997              2001               2007
Source: China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) data.
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7 Excluding factors of production, 
such as land and capital; efforts are 
currently underway to regulate the 
pesticide industry.
8 Many of the local storage facilities 
formerly owned by the Grain Bureau 
have been sold off; however, local 
governments are often among the new 
owners so that these facilities become 
partly Government-owned, maintain-
ing close relations with State market-
ing agencies.8
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Table 1
Urban household annual consumption of food products, 1981-2006
Product 1981 2006  Change
kg per person kg Percent
Grain 145.4 75.9 -69.5 -48
Edible vegetable oil 4.8 9.4 4.6 95
Pork 16.9 20.0 3.1 18
Beef and mutton 1.7 3.8 2.1 125
Poultry 1.9 8.3 6.4 334
Fresh eggs 5.2 10.4 5.2 99
Aquatic products 7.3 12.5 5.2 71
Milk 4.1 18.3  14.2 343
Note: Table shows averages from national household surveys.
Source: Economic Research Service calculations based on China’s National Bureau 
of Statistics (NBS) data.
is typically purchased directly from farmers, often just after harvest and on 
the roadside, by hundreds of thousands of private traders who cruise villages 
and the surrounding countryside in small trucks.  These traders then sell their 
load to larger traders or deliver it to wholesale markets where it is typically 
aggregated onto larger trucks for transport to faraway markets.  Livestock 
products, particularly pork raised by farm households, are also marketed by 
multiple small traders, but there is also a growing contingent of large-scale 
farms and sophisticated agribusinesses.  Small traders and brokers visit 
villages to buy pigs on behalf of local slaughterhouses that market most 
of their pork in local markets through a shrinking corps of small vendors. 
Supermarket chains require a more sophisticated supply chain that can 
guarantee refrigeration and lean pork free of banned substances. Large pork 
companies process frozen pork in some inland provinces, such as Sichuan, 
where it is then shipped to cities on China’s east coast.  The volume of agri-
cultural produce going through modern marketing channels appears to be 
growing, but traditional supply chains operate with lower costs and recent 
surveys found nearly all fruits and vegetables were still marketed through 
traditional channels  (Huang, Wu, Zhi, and Rozelle, 2008). 
Consumption  
As income growth elevated millions of consumers from poverty, diets 
improved and diversiﬁ  ed (Lohmar, 2002; Gale, 2003; Gale and Huang, 
2007).  Caloric intake rose and deﬁ  ciencies in vitamins and trace elements 
became less prevalent, but consumption of fats increased. The Chinese 
diet now includes fewer grain products like rice, bread, and noodles, while 
consumption of meats, eggs, and dairy has risen. According to ﬁ  gures 
published by China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), annual grain 
consumption by urban households fell by nearly half, from 145 kilograms 
(kg) per person in 1981 to 76 kg in 2006, while consumption of vegetable oils 
and animal protein products rose by varying amounts (table 1). The diet of 
China’s rural population is following a similar trajectory as rising living stan-
dards spread to the countryside (Gale et al., 2005).  Because rural residents’ 
food grain consumption is so much higher than urban residents (roughly three 9
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times higher), urbanization is a primary driver of falling per capita food grain 
consumption in China.
Rising incomes and market liberalization are changing the way food is 
consumed in China (Gale, 2003).  Meals consumed away from home are the 
fastest growing component of food spending (Gale and Huang, 2007).  An 
increasing share of food is purchased in modern supermarkets, restaurants, 
cafeterias, and food stalls.  Many urban consumers seek out quality, safety, 
and convenience over quantity and price.  Organic food counters are now 
common in Chinese supermarkets, reﬂ  ecting concerns about health and 
safety.  Analysis of NBS household consumption data shows that much of 
the increased food spending by urban consumers reﬂ  ects higher per-unit 
spending rather than larger quantities, an effect that is commonly attributed 
to preferences for quality (Gale and Huang, 2007).  According to NBS data, 
the percent of household disposable income spent on food purchases has 
fallen consistently over the reform period from approximately 48 percent in 
1985 to just over 26 percent in 2006.   
Trade  
China’s agricultural imports and exports were relatively low over most of 
the reform period, but have risen rapidly since WTO accession.9  China 
became one of the world’s top four agricultural import countries as its agri-
cultural imports jumped from under $11 billion (U.S. dollars) in 2002 to 
over $57 billion (U.S. dollars) in 2008.  China’s agricultural exports have 
grown as well, but not as dramatically as imports. Agricultural exports rose 
from $13 billion (U.S. dollars) in 2002 to $29 billion (U.S. dollars) in 2008 
(ﬁ  g. 5).  Moreover, the composition of agricultural trade has changed.  Over 
much of the reform period, China exported corn and imported wheat, but 
imported only limited amounts of cotton and oilseeds.10  Today, China is 
largely self-sufﬁ  cient in wheat, corn and rice, but it imports large amounts 
Figure 5
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9 Imports and exports were small rela-
tive to the size of China’s agricultural 
economy, but trade, both imports and 
exports, in speciﬁ  c products was at 
times large when compared with the 
world market for those products.
10 For most of the reform period, trade 
in all of these commodities was con-
trolled by State trading monopolies.10
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of soybeans and cotton.  China has also become a major exporter of many 
fruit, vegetable, and livestock products, including apples, garlic, aquaculture 
products, poultry and pork.  Since the United States is a major producer of 
cotton and soybeans, producers of those products have beneﬁ  ted greatly from 
trade with China.  U.S. agricultural exports to China jumped from $2 billion 
(U.S. dollars) before WTO accession to $8.3 billion (U.S. dollars) in 2007.  
U.S. agricultural imports from China were only $2.9 billion (U.S. dollars) in 
2007.11
In addition to providing low-priced food for urban and industrial workers, 
agriculture played a direct role in China’s rapid industrial development.  
Rural labor contributed heavily to the growth of the industrial, construc-
tion, and service sectors in China.  Between 1978 and 2007, the number of 
rural workers with nonfarm employment rose from an estimated 30 million 
workers to over 200 million, an increase greater than the entire labor force 
of the United States (ﬁ  g. 6).12  By some estimates, 80 percent of rural house-
holds have some form of nonfarm employment (de Brauw et al., 2002).  On 
average, over half of rural household income in China is from nonagricultural 
jobs, remittances, and investments (ﬁ  g. 7).  Income from nonfarm sources 
gives rural households funds to construct new houses, pay children’s school 
fees, and invest in agriculture. 
The Next Stage of Reforms
China’s transformation from a closed, planned economy into a dynamic 
market-driven economy has been dramatic.  Production and marketing 
reforms allow farmers more choice in their production practices, marketing 
venues, and income earning opportunities.  This ﬂ  exibility has allowed 
farmers to produce more staple grains while simultaneously shifting 
resources into livestock and horticulture production and supplying labor to 
the booming nonfarm economy.   
Figure 6
China’s rural employment in nonagricultural sectors grows, 1978-2007
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11 This ﬁ  gure does not include the 
$2 billion (U.S. dollars) in ﬁ  sh and 
seafood imports from China or the 
roughly $3 billion (U.S. dollars) in 
wood paneling and ﬁ  nished wood 
products, two import categories that 
have been rising rapidly since WTO 
accession.
12 These estimates are widely believed 
to undercount millions of rural workers 
in the urban service sector.11
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China was able to achieve enormous production gains in the three decades 
after reforms, in part, because the economy produced far below its potential 
under central planning.  Giving farmers incentives and abandoning produc-
tion quotas induced farmers to work hard and produce what consumers 
demanded.  Looser provincial self-sufﬁ  ciency requirements allowed farmers 
to abandon crops that grew poorly in their region and specialize in products 
they could produce most efﬁ  ciently (Carter and Lohmar, 2002).  Post-1978 
reforms brought forth a tremendous surge of output that showed China’s 
production potential was greater than most observers imagined.
Three decades after reforms began, China’s agricultural sector has succeeded 
in feeding and clothing its population, while also opening up to interna-
tional markets and developing agricultural exports.  But with land and water 
resources stretched to the limit and labor costs rising, it is unclear whether 
agricultural production in China can maintain its rapid growth.  Future gains 
may require a new round of reforms that provide incentives to use land 
and water resources more efﬁ  ciently, incentives to develop and adopt new 
technologies to substitute for labor or enhance the productivity of land, and 
incentives to increase the quality of agricultural products, including food 
safety.  Establishing market-supporting institutions, such as clear property 
rights and open contract and dispute settlement mechanisms, will provide 
institutional support for these incentives.13  As land, water, and other agri-
cultural resources increase in value, the demand for more clearly deﬁ  ned 
property rights and dispute settlement mechanisms will increase as well.  
Independent suppliers and farmers alike will demand dispute settlement 
services as they seek out assurances of quality, safety, and consistency from 
thousands of independent producers and input suppliers.  Users of collec-
tively or State-owned factors, such as land and water, will beneﬁ  t from a 
more precise deﬁ  nition of their rights to these assets as their value increases 
in the rapidly growing economy.  Developing a regulatory framework to 
Figure 7
China’s rural household income, by category, 1985-2006
Percent of total income
Source: Economic Research Service calculations based on China’s National Bureau
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13 Economic historians often point to 
clearly deﬁ  ned property rights, particu-
larly to land, and open contestable laws 
and courts as critical to supporting 
the function of markets in developed 
countries and helping to manage to 
reallocation of resources brought about 
by industrialization.12
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deﬁ  ne property rights and resolve disputes, however, will be costly in both 
time and ﬁ  nances. 
China is only just beginning to establish a more modern, market-supporting 
institutional framework.  Recent laws help clarify rights to important 
resources such as land and water.14  China is also graduating more students 
from law schools and expanding the jurisdictional authority of the courts, 
while farmers are increasingly turning to courts to settle disputes over land 
rights (Clarke, Murrell, and Whiting, 2008).  
China’s path toward modernization has implications for future production, 
consumption, and trade.  Millions of China’s farm households will beneﬁ  t 
from more secure rights to productive assets and better assurances to the 
quality of agricultural inputs. These changes will help farmers increase yields 
and reduce production costs.  Increasing the integrity of marketing chan-
nels and segregating commodities to preserve quality and other attributes 
will allow farmers to earn premiums for higher quality and safer production 
practices.  A variety of other policies, including rural credit and agricultural 
technology development and extension, will help farmers in China compete 
in a global marketplace.  Taken together, such policies could continue the era 
of increased productivity, generate more and better quality food for increas-
ingly wealthy consumers, raise rural incomes, and support China’s successful 
integration into world agricultural markets.
14 Such as the 2002 Rural Land Con-
tracting Law and the 2001 Water Law.
Photo by William Coyle, Economic Research Service.
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Challenges to China’s 
Continued Agricultural Modernization  
Over the last three decades, the Chinese Government has largely relin-
quished its direct role in setting prices, procuring, and marketing agricultural 
commodities.  Yet, many of the institutions that manage and regulate markets 
in more developed countries are not fully established in China.  China’s 
lack of market-supporting institutions, such as extensive property registra-
tion and a well-developed legal system to enforce laws and contracts, may 
impede the ability of the market to bring about efﬁ  cient, equitable outcomes.  
Establishing those institutions, however, is not feasible in the short term.
Consequently, China still tends to rely on interventionist policies that use the 
remaining apparatus of the collective period to address issues that are typi-
cally resolved by independent institutions in more developed countries. 15  
While markets for inputs and outputs are well established, the Government 
still plays an inﬂ  uential “behind the scenes” role by controlling key factors 
of production (land and formal credit), ownership interest in some agri-
business enterprises, and arbitration of disputes.  In the absence of private 
property and open, contestable dispute settlement institutions, Government 
ofﬁ  cials play a key role in managing property rights, resolving disputes, and 
addressing complex problems related to food safety, environmental protec-
tion, and resource allocation.
Understanding the continued direct role of the Government in agricultural 
policies is important when evaluating the policy responses to the critical 
issues that continually confront China’s leadership.  Interventionist policies 
and practices can be implemented relatively quickly to address problems 
as they arise, but China’s consumers and producers may be missing out 
on bigger longrun efﬁ  ciency gains that could be achieved by establishing 
independent market-supporting institutions and allowing the private sector 
a greater role in investment and resource allocation. These more difﬁ  cult 
reforms potentially could guide China’s continued transformation into a 
modern industrialized economy with a healthy, dynamic agricultural sector.
China faces several challenges as it modernizes its agricultural sector.  
Resources in China are showing signs of over use, prompting policies to 
reduce intensive use of chemical inputs and promote land and water conser-
vation.  Moreover, as labor leaves agriculture, demand for more ﬂ  exible 
land management institutions is rising.  China faces several marketing chal-
lenges as consumers increasingly purchase products from supermarkets and 
other modern venues, expecting quality, safety, convenience, and variety 
similar to consumers in more developed countries.  Providing additional 
income support to farm households as the industrial sector pulls ahead and 
leaves agriculture behind has become a central concern, as is common in 
countries at a similar level of development.  Lastly, China seeks to catch 
up with developed countries in agricultural technologies, including biotech 
and biofuel technologies, which could prove vital for maintaining food and 
energy needs in the future.
15 There are also ideological consider-
ations in China’s Government, which 
promotes a “socialist market econo-
my,” that affect their policy responses, 
as well as political considerations 
regarding the employment of a large 
Government bureaucracy and over-
staffed Government-owned enterprises.14
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Resource Management Policies 
The impressive gains in agricultural and industrial production in China over 
the last 30 years were achieved, in part, by taxing land and water resources.  
Government ofﬁ  cials and the growing urban middle class want to impose 
more stringent conservation practices to ensure the long-term health of these 
vital resources.  Resources, including land, however, are owned and managed 
by Government-run entities, and the agents in charge of these resources 
do not typically have an incentive to use them conservatively.  Reforms to 
improve land management and incentives to conserve could increase the efﬁ  -
ciency by which these resources are used, boost production beyond current 
levels, and maintain these resources for future generations. 
Land
Compared with the enormous changes in China’s economy and agricultural 
market development, land tenure practices have changed little since the 
adoption of HRS.  Agricultural land is still collectively owned in China and 
village leaders manage land on behalf of the collective owners, resulting in a 
complex mix of locally deﬁ  ned rights and practices (Lohmar, Somwaru, and 
Wiebe, 2002).  Unclear ownership rights discourage land-saving investments, 
raise the cost of aggregating land, and inhibit China’s capacity to deal with an 
expanding array of rural problems: rising labor costs, an aging rural popula-
tion, chaotic supply chains, lack of traceability mechanisms, and soil erosion.  
China’s Government has established laws to clarify and secure farm house-
holds’ rights to land and allow them to rent land, without giving up collective 
ownership. In recent years subcontracting and rental of land use rights has 
become more common, encouraged by the departure of millions of farmers 
for urban jobs and commercialization of agriculture (see box, “China’s 
Evolving Land Management Practices,” page 15), and some farmers and 
companies have consolidated land into large commercial farms. Still, vague 
land ownership constrains land rental (Deininger and Jin, 2007), and most of 
China’s farm sector is characterized by small, fragmented plots of land.
Land Allocated in Small Plots 
Village leaders allocate 
the rights to several plots 
to farm households.  
Because leaders seek an 
egalitarian distribution, 
each household typically 
receives 4-6 separate 
plots:  one or two plots 
for grain, one plot close to 
the village for vegetable 
production, one plot on 
the more marginal hill-
side area, etc.16  Plots for 
growing grain are usually 
allocated contiguously in 
a large ﬁ  eld where dozens 
Fields divided and cultivated by different households
Photo by Fred Gale, Economic Research Service. 
16 The 4-6 plots add up to only 1.5 
acres on average, so each individual 
plot averages 0.25-.4 acres in size.15
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China’s national laws set a general legal framework, but speciﬁ  c prac-
tices for managing collectively owned land vary from village to village.  
Some villages periodically reallocate land among households, while 
others have kept the original allocation made in the early 1980s. Some 
villages impose strict controls on land transfers, while others have 
devised arrangements to consolidate land and rent or subcontract it. In 
some villages, members pool their land and distribute shares in a stock-
holding cooperative that pays dividends based on land rental payments.  
Some villages in areas with thriving industries hire migrants from other 
provinces to cultivate their land. 
Many observers expected major changes in land policies to emerge from 
an October 2008 meeting of the Communist Party that focused on rural 
issues and marked the 30th anniversary of landmark 1978 rural reforms. 
Announcements following the meeting gave a vague assurance that 
farmers’ land use rights would be secure for “a long time” and encour-
aged farmers to pursue various means of trading and transferring land 
use rights that were already widely practiced.  Ofﬁ  cials emphasized that 
farmers cannot sell their land, cannot change its use, and cannot use it 
as security for a mortgage. Ofﬁ  cials have begun allowing farmers to 
mortgage timber or fruit orchard land in some regions, but it is not clear 
whether this practice will be extended to cropland.  
Policy announcements promised stricter controls on land seizures, but 
no new policies or legal institutions were created to settle disputes.  
Anecdotal reports indicate that some local governments are exploring 
ways to improve land transfer. In one prefecture of Zhejiang, the 
local government established village land transfer service stations to 
intermediate land rentals (Jiang and Ke, 2009). The Hunan Provincial 
government allocated funds to waive farmers’ fees for renewing land 
certiﬁ  cates and contract documents; in one prefecture of Hunan, less 
than half of land transfers involved a signed document, but this number 
was up 20 percentage points from previous years (Hou, 2008). 
The return of migrants highlighted the beneﬁ  ts and conﬂ  icts associ-
ated with China’s land tenure system. Following the 2008 downturn in 
the global economy, millions of rural migrants laid off from factories 
returned to their home villages where they had rights to land tended 
by family members or rented to others. Small-scale farming generates 
much less income than factory work, and anecdotal reports indicate 
that migrants were not inclined to return to farming. Still, land rights 
guaranteed at least a basic livelihood. Some anecdotal reports, however, 
noted potential disputes with lessees over land contracts and difﬁ  culties 
returning plots that had been consolidated into large commercial farming 
operations.  
China’s Evolving Land Management Practices16
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of households have rights to individual sections of the ﬁ  eld that, from the 
roadside, looks like any grain ﬁ  eld in the Midwestern United States.  
The atomistic production structure that results from China’s land tenure 
system raises the cost of production and of aggregating land for more 
commercial agriculture.  Multiple trips to work on multiple small parcels 
add to the cost of production.  Aggregating land through rental activity to 
obtain more commercially efﬁ  cient land sizes is costly, particularly when the 
size of each plot is small and available plots typically are not contiguous to 
those controlled by the farmer interested in expanding.17  Rental markets in 
most parts of China may be very thin, but are growing (Deininger and Jin, 
2005; Zhu et al., 2007). Village leaders may seek to coordinate some type 
of “uniﬁ  ed production” on portions of village land, but most households 
prefer to purchase their own inputs and make their own production decisions.  
Direct linkages with modern supply chains are expensive to develop because 
of the small plot sizes, and the Government has been slow to allow farmers to 
organize their own producer associations to coordinate linkages.18
Taking Village Land   
As the designated managers of collectively owned land, village leaders can 
take land away from households and allocate use rights to other households 
or convert it to nonfarm uses.  Originally, village leaders had explicit rights 
to reallocate land to maintain an egalitarian distribution after births, deaths, 
and marriages, but village leaders no longer have explicit rights to reallocate 
land.  Instead, households are entitled to 30-year written leases on the land 
allocated to them.19 Leaders still have some room to maneuver and take back 
land for other uses, but also do it illegally.  In a 2005 survey of 1,962 farm 
households in 17 provinces, fewer than 1 in 5 farmers (19 percent) believed 
there would be no more reallocations over the 30-year period (Zhu et al., 
2007).  The survey question only included village reallocations of agricul-
tural land; land reallocation for nonagricultural use was not addressed. 
While policies have sought to end periodic land reallocations within agri-
culture, village leaders still have the right to take land from households for 
nonagricultural uses.  Legally, village leaders must get farmers’ approval 
and authorization from the township to convert agricultural land and must 
pay compensation to households according to the discounted value of that 
land in agricultural production over a 30-year horizon.  The various means 
to calculate this value provide ample opportunity to dispute the ﬁ  nal ﬁ  gure 
and, even if assessed correctly, it may be well below the value of the land in 
nonagricultural uses.  Moreover, affected households may not be included in 
the deliberations to take land for nonagricultural use, and there is widespread 
belief that households sometimes receive only a fraction of their entitled 
amount.  These land reallocations and perceived corruption or inadequate 
compensation are behind many incidents of rural unrest in China.
Land Improvement and Conservation  
To boost domestic food production, as well as employ its large rural popula-
tion, China has stressed land resources by farming steep hillsides and areas 
that other more land-abundant countries do not farm, creating soil erosion 
problems.  Land has also been degraded by intensive chemical applications 
and by rarely leaving land out of production to “rest.”  As the agents of 
collective owners, village leaders have an obligation to maintain the long-
17 Rental activity may also be discour-
aged by reallocation policies in some 
villages where renting out land serves 
as a signal to village leaders that the 
land can be reallocated to another 
household.
18  In a 2003 survey of villages in 216 
townships in 6 provinces in China, 
researchers found that approximately 
2 percent of farm households belonged 
to a functional producer association 
(Shen et al., 2006).  The Government 
has begun encouraging farmers to join 
cooperatives and producer associations 
since a 2007 law clariﬁ  ed the legal sta-
tus of such organizations, but associa-
tions are small, localized, and often led 
by village ofﬁ  cials.
19 According to the 2002 Rural Land 
Contracting Law and previous direc-
tives and laws.17
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term productivity of the land.  As the direct beneﬁ  ciaries of the use rights 
to the land, farm households have an incentive to maintain and improve the 
productivity of the land.  Uncertainty over their long-term rights to the land, 
however, dulls farmer’s incentives to make long-term productivity improving 
investments and rely more heavily on short-term productivity measures such 
as chemical fertilizers and pesticides.20  While village leaders manage the 
land under collective ownership, they are only appointed for a ﬁ  xed period. 
Increasing agricultural and nonagricultural production under their leader-
ship beneﬁ  ts their performance evaluation, so they too do not have strong 
incentives to tradeoff short-term production for long-term productivity nor to 
prevent farm land from conversion into nonagricultural uses.
Evolving tenure security and mechanisms to pool land into more commer-
cially viable plots will affect China’s competitiveness on world markets and 
ensure land productivity for future generations.  Lowering the cost of aggre-
gating plots will facilitate adjustments as labor becomes more expensive 
and the current cohort of farmers ages.  Larger commercial plots will raise 
farmers’ incentives to carefully select and verify the quality of inputs from 
China’s fragmented input providers to maximize proﬁ  ts and implement prac-
tices to ensure quality and safety.   
Collective ownership is also linked with social welfare issues. Land provides 
social security for the elderly and acts as a safety net for rural workers who 
have trouble ﬁ  nding employment outside of agriculture.  Many farmers 
support collective ownership and favor land reallocations that maintain an 
egalitarian distribution of land (Kung, 1995).21  While using land as an 
income security institution has served China well thus far, it distracts from 
establishing institutions to use land more efﬁ  ciently in agricultural produc-
tion.  Establishing separate, viable institutions to provide income security 
will help China establish more effective land tenure policies.  In Cixi prefec-
ture, the land rental system is paired with a social security system; elderly 
villagers can receive land rental and social insurance payments of 400-500 
yuan per month, enough to cover basic needs (Jiang and Ke, 2009). More 
importantly, institutions to register and enforce farmers’ land rights are still 
underdeveloped but will be critical to further reform.  Recent reforms to 
increase farmers’ rights to land, such as the 2002 Rural Land Contracting 
Law, are undermined by an inability to independently register land rights and 
settle disputes according to the law. 
Water
Like the United States, China’s water endowment is unevenly distributed.  
Water is relatively abundant in the south, but it is scarce in the north (ﬁ  gs. 
8-9).  Extensive irrigation is key to China’s capacity to maintain agricultural 
production.  Important crops in water-scarce areas that rely on irrigation 
include wheat, corn, and cotton, as well as China’s increasing production of 
horticultural crops.22  But in the reform period, rapid demand for water in 
the industrial and urban areas generated intense competition for limited water 
resources.  Rising water demand is causing rivers to run dry and groundwater 
tables to fall.
20 Several studies found that farmers 
decrease their investments when tenure 
is less secure in China (Jacoby, Li, 
and Rozelle, 2002; Deininger and Jin, 
2007; Zhu et al., 2007)
21 Taking land for nonagricultural use 
has been much more contentious, but 
conﬂ  icts appear to focus more on the 
closed-door nature of the process and 
farmers’ share of the proceeds than 
with the transfer of the land out of 
agriculture itself.
22 Although rice is heavily reliant on 
irrigation, most of it is produced in the 
water-abundant southern part of China.  
Much of northern China receives 
sufﬁ  cient rainfall for agriculture in 
an average year, but 70 percent of the 
rainfall comes in the summer months 
(July-September), the primary growing 
season for corn and cotton.  Winter 
wheat production in northern China 
occurs from October to June and relies 
heavily on irrigation during this period.18
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Note: Highlighted areas represent regions of greatest water scarcity.
Source: Economic Research Service analysis based on ESRI, Inc. data. 
Figure 9
Areas of water scarcity in China, by region
Figure 8
China’s per capita water resources are below the world average,
northern China even lower
               World                                  China                      Northern China
Note: Northern China refers to the Hai, Huang (Yellow), and Huai River Basins, areas 
where water scarcity is most serious (see map below).
Source:  China’s Ministry of Water Resources.
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Water Policies 
All water in China is owned by the State, and, in northern China, roughly 50 
percent comes from surface sources and the remainder from ground water.23  
Surface water is managed by the Ministry of Water Resources and its local 
water resource ofﬁ  ces that oversee a network of large and small irrigation 
districts (Lohmar et al., 2003).  Efforts to promote more efﬁ  cient use of 
surface water include management reforms that typically involve providing 
water managers with incentives to use less water and improve delivery 
services (Huang et al., 2007).24  Surface water prices, however, are set by the 
Government and, despite price increases over the last decade, water prices 
remain too low for most districts to recover operating costs, much less addi-
tional revenue for investments in infrastructure improvements.25
Many farmers have turned to ground water for irrigation in water-scarce 
northern China, but groundwater management policies are neither clearly 
deﬁ  ned nor vigorously enforced.  China had the means to control ground 
water withdrawals during the collective period because wells were dug by 
Government-owned enterprises and owned by Government-run local collec-
tives.  Recently, there has been a proliferation of privately owned wells that 
serve irrigators and collect payments from farmers based partly on the costs 
of pumping and delivering the water (Wang et al., 2006).  The private wells 
are difﬁ  cult to regulate and the State, which nominally owns the water, does 
not receive payment for the water extracted.  Since pumping costs rise as the 
water table falls, volumetric prices increase as ground water becomes more 
limited, providing some incentives to use water more efﬁ  ciently.  
Incentives To Conserve  
China’s water management policies do not provide strong incentives to 
conserve water.26  For surface water and nearly all ground water, farmers are 
charged a fraction of what the water is worth in agriculture, which is a frac-
tion of its value in other sectors.27  For most ground water, the price is still 
low enough that farmers have little incentive to invest in improvements or 
adopt technology to improve irrigation efﬁ  ciency (Blanke et al., 2007).  For 
surface water, farmers typically do not pay for water by volume, but instead 
pay a ﬁ  xed amount based on the area they irrigate.  With Government-
determined prices, irrigation districts earn income from the amount of water 
they sell, so they are not encouraged to conserve or to invest in conveyance.  
Some local water managers have an incentive to use surface water efﬁ  ciently, 
but the incentive is typically to invest in and manage conveyance to the 
ﬁ  eld more carefully so that more farmers receive irrigation.  This increases 
fee remission from farm households, from which the manager may get a 
percentage, but does not necessarily reduce overall water use in agriculture 
and can reduce the return ﬂ  ow of water to streams or water tables, thereby 
reducing water availability to downstream users. 
Rising water prices for farmers are a hotly debated topic in China.  While 
raising water prices would induce farmers to conserve water, current policies 
are focused on reducing water costs to farmers to raise their incomes (see, 
rural income discussion on page 25).  Moreover, water conservation conﬂ  icts 
with another Government priority—maintaining near (95 percent) self-sufﬁ  -
ciency in grain (see box, “China’s Agricultural Policy Dilemma,” page 20). 
Higher water prices may lead to lower grain yields as farmers reduce water 
use. Some farmers abandoned grain production when ground water pumping 
23 In southern China, far more comes 
from surface water than in northern 
China.
24 Reforms include contracting canal 
management out to an individual to 
manage or setting up a Water User 
Association (WUA) that identiﬁ  es a 
manager to take over selected tasks.  
Some, but not all, of these managers 
have a direct incentive to reduce water 
use and improve fee remission.
25 For all State-owned assets, national 
ofﬁ  ces of the Price Bureau still deter-
mine price guidelines and ranges, and 
local Price Bureau ofﬁ  ces set prices in 
accordance with these guidelines.
26 China is not unique in this regard.
27 The exception is when the ground 
water table falls deep enough that 
charges rise to levels where farmers 
choose to either conserve or switch 
crop patterns.20
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China’s agricultural policies are intended to achieve multiple objectives that often conﬂ  ict. While the balancing 
of strategic, consumer, and producer welfare objectives present tradeoffs for policymakers in all countries, the 
conﬂ  ict between these goals has become especially clear in China. 
For decades, achieving self-sufﬁ  ciency in food production has been a primary strategic goal for China’s agri-
cultural policymakers.  The leadership mobilized resources to increase production of grain, cotton, and other 
strategic crops during the collective period and this carried over into the reform period, most visibly during a 
campaign to boost grain output in the mid-1990s.  As China further integrated into the world economy, self-
sufﬁ  ciency goals were relaxed for most products, but leaders still maintained near-self-sufﬁ  ciency goals 
(95 percent) for rice, wheat, and corn.
Since the late 1990s, poli-
cymakers have sought to 
simultaneously increase grain 
production and farm incomes.  
These two objectives conﬂ  ict 
since producing grain is less prof-
itable than other types of farming. 
Net cash returns earned by 
Chinese farmers from vegetables 
and fruits are several times higher 
than returns from rice, wheat, and 
corn (see ﬁ  gure at left).  
Recent events show that rural 
income objectives can also 
conﬂ  ict with urban consumer 
welfare objectives.  International 
prices for most commodities rose 
sharply between 2007 and 2008, 
but Chinese ofﬁ  cials sought to 
limit domestic price increases 
by shutting down exports of 
grains, cutting soybean tariffs, 
and importing vegetable oil. 
Domestic prices for some types 
of Chinese grain were almost 50 
percent lower than international 
prices.  Limiting the rise in prices 
protected consumers, but denied 
Chinese farmers a potential 
windfall. 
China’s Agricultural Policy Dilemma
China’s farmers receive relatively low returns from grain
Source: Economic Research Service calculations based on China’s National Development 
and Reform Commission data.
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costs rose.  Establishing viable water trading regimes might allow farmers 
to beneﬁ  t by selling their water rights to higher valuing users, but this too 
may cause farmers to forego grain production.  Experiments in water trading 
regimes ﬁ  nd that they are difﬁ  cult to establish because farmers are wary of 
losing their water rights altogether if they begin selling it to more powerful 
nonagricultural interests (Zhang, 2006).  Thus, as with land, establishing 
more efﬁ  cient water allocation regimes is hamstrung, in part, by under-
developed property rights enforcement institutions.
The lack of regulation for ground water withdrawals also affects the severity 
of water scarcity.  In the Hai River Basin and other parts of northern China, 
ground water tables are not only falling rapidly, but there is scant policy 
enforcement to curb the expansion of private wells.  The falling water table 
increases the price of water beyond its economic value in wheat or other 
ﬁ  eld crop production, inducing farmers to either use water more efﬁ  ciently 
or switch to crops that bring higher returns to water.  Alternatives include 
relatively water-intensive fruit and vegetable crops, which are both more 
proﬁ  table and more suited to efﬁ  cient irrigation delivery technology, such as 
drip or micro-sprinkler irrigation (ﬁ  g. 10).28
While many observers see water shortages as a threat to China’s agricultural 
production capacity, there is little evidence that systemic water scarcity has 
adversely affected production to date, and China could avert future effects 
by improving water conservation.  Conservation is occurring, albeit slowly, 
in surface water systems.  It is also occurring somewhat inadvertently in 
ground water systems as the water tables are drawn down to the point that 
farmers switch out of grain and into crops that bring a higher return to water.  
If these trends continue, water shortages will likely not bring about a surge in 
Figure 10
Farmers move into cash crops as pumping costs rise
     1-25 percent     26-50 percent       51-75 percent    76-100 percent
 
           4.7m                    8.8m                     40m                      79m
Source:  Survey by the Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy, Chinese Academy of Sciences, 
of 400 villages in Hebei and Henan Provinces.















28 Horticultural crops that bring a 
higher value to water may also be 
riskier than grain crops and require 
some initial investment that discourag-
es farmers from producing them when 
water is less costly.22
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demand for grain imports.  Because China’s water shortages occur primarily 
in northern China, and China is a large country, a regional shift out of grain 
and cotton production would cause prices for these commodities to rise, 
consumers to consume less, and producers in other parts of China to produce 
more, dampening the demand for imports (Lohmar and Hansen, 2007).29
Agricultural Marketing Challenges
China’s traditional agricultural marketing system is extremely efﬁ  cient, ﬂ  ex-
ible, and low cost, but these efﬁ  ciencies come at the expense of providing 
strong incentives for producers or marketing agents to achieve quality 
or safety.  However, quality and safety characteristics are increasingly 
demanded by the growing food processing sector, modern retailers, middle 
class consumers, and export markets.  The atomistic nature of production 
and marketing, the lack of effective contract enforcement mechanisms, 
and the scarcity of farmer organizations make it difﬁ  cult and costly for 
traders, packers, and suppliers to ensure food safety and consistent quality.  
Investments in higher quality storage, transportation, and cold chain infra-
structure would reduce waste through spoilage, allow for more regional 
specialization, and facilitate the distribution of imported products throughout 
the country.  
Improving food safety has become the central challenge in China’s marketing 
reform efforts.  The Government has taken a leading role in addressing 
food safety issues in China, in part, because the institutional framework 
for markets to provide safety assurances is not yet developed.  Beneﬁ  ts to 
farmers providing food safety assurances are limited because their products 
are typically aggregated with products from other producers in the marketing 
chain, often at the point of sale.  Companies that institute costly measures 
to ensure food safety cannot recoup these costs because counterfeiting and 
other mislabeling are so widespread that consumers lack the conﬁ  dence in 
private assurances to pay a high premium for them.  Companies producing 
unsafe products have little risk of being caught and, if they are caught, they 
are typically not ﬁ  ned or liable for damages, but instead shut down and may 
even reopen somewhere else.30  In this environment, the market will lag in 
providing the safety assurances that consumers demand, creating a role for 
Government intervention.  Resolving obstacles to more market-oriented solu-
tions, however, could provide more sustainable solutions and allow farmers 
to receive more of the price premiums for producing safe and high-quality 
products.
A weak marketing system constrains the supply of products with special attri-
butes.  Because the marketing system is not conducive to segregating higher-
quality products, it prevents the farmer from producing high-quality products 
and selling them at a premium.  Unlike food safety, high-quality fruit and 
vegetable products can be determined largely by consumers at the point of 
purchase, so there is some incentive for marketing agents and suppliers to 
specialize in higher quality products.  In more modern economies, suppliers 
and processors often contract with producers or producer groups to provide 
products based on set guidelines to obtain speciﬁ  c quality and safety char-
acteristics.  In China, however, contracting for production is limited and not 
particularly effective because few contract enforcement institutions exist.  
The large number of farm households needed to produce commercially viable 
29 The extent to which production falls 
in one region and causes prices to rise 
depends critically on import policies.
30 The majority of food processing 
businesses are small, often family 
owned, enterprises operating out of 
households or rented facilities with 
very little capital investment and are 
relatively mobile (Thompson and Hu, 
2007).23
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quantities of product also raises the cost of contracting directly with farmers. 
The limited contracts that do exist are typically with village leaders or 
producer associations that coordinate production among members or village 
farmers.  Producer associations, in particular, could facilitate adoption of 
technologies and good agricultural practices to produce safe and high-quality 
products, but the establishment of truly independent producers’ associations 
in China has been limited to date.  
Marketing issues also extend beyond horticultural products.31  In the past 
decade, China has established a program to increase wheat quality because 
the competitive food processing industry seeks wheat with speciﬁ  c quality 
characteristics that domestic producers have little incentive to produce.  The 
effectiveness of this program, however, is also reduced by the atomistic 
nature of wheat marketing and the few incentives to segregate wheat by 
quality characteristics.  Milk marketing and quality assurance issues stem-
ming from the large number of small producers came to the fore in 2008 (see 
box below, “Food Safety Setback:  Infant Milk Production”).
Food Safety 
Improving food safety is a major issue among both China’s domestic 
consumers and food export industries, but poses many challenges (Calvin et 
al., 2006; Ellis and Turner, 2008).  An atomistic farm sector, coupled with 
In 2008, a number of infants in China died and thousands were sickened 
after consuming powdered infant formula tainted with melamine, an 
industrial chemical that can cause renal failure. The milk powder inci-
dent highlighted the lack of institutional mechanisms to monitor and 
enforce standards in an atomistic supply and processing sector. The milk 
found to be adulterated came from large companies with internation-
ally recognized food safety certiﬁ  cations selling well-known brands, but 
they procured much of their raw milk from small farmers who brought 
their milk to local purchasing stations operated by independent contrac-
tors. Melamine was allegedly introduced by merchants and handlers to 
boost the apparent protein content after the milk was watered down. In 
2007, a representative from one of China’s two biggest dairy compa-
nies presented the company’s detailed food safety management system, 
which appeared to build in adequate safeguards (Zhang, W., 2007), yet 
its products were among those found to be adulterated in 2008. The 
incident also revealed apparent complicity between a company and local 
ofﬁ  cials to cover up the problem and pay off victims to forestall legal 
action. 
Following the milk powder incident, some companies began sourcing 
more of their milk from large company-owned farms, while others 
required small farmers to bring their cows to be milked at central loca-
tions. Companies also began posting their own employees at milk 
stations to monitor transactions. Government subsidies funded increased 
testing of raw milk at the point of purchase and at processing plants.
Food Safety Setback: Infant Milk Production
31 Grain marketing in China is inﬂ  u-
enced more by State-owned or State-
afﬁ  liated companies than horticultural 
marketing, reﬂ  ecting remnants of the 
former State-owned marketing mo-
nopolies in grains and strategic crops.24
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high agricultural chemical use on crops and in livestock production, increases 
the risks and the costs of monitoring.  China’s marketing and food processing 
sectors are also fragmented.  Some estimates report that approximately 1 
million food processing companies—70 percent of which have fewer than 10 
employees—and probably millions more traders and merchants handle food 
and agricultural products.  The agricultural chemical industry in China is also 
fragmented and without effective regulation.  Counterfeiting and mislabeling 
products is not uncommon.  Farmers’ knowledge of these products, and how 
to use them to reduce residue at the point of consumption, is also limited. 
To combat these problems, China has established a complex set of standards 
(central and provincial government standards; industry and private safety 
standards) and assigned food safety responsibilities to a number of agen-
cies.  Keeping track of the various standards is confusing to producers and 
consumers alike.  Many Chinese standards were adapted from international 
models, often with modiﬁ  cations, and they can vary from province to prov-
ince.  Food safety enforcement and monitoring responsibilities are divided 
among several Government agencies. The Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) 
supports programs for improving the safety of produce and meat and testing 
fresh products in wholesale markets. Provincial-level ofﬁ  ces of the General 
Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection, and Quarantine (AQSIQ) 
oversee domestic food processors, and the national AQSIQ ofﬁ  ce oversees 
safety of exported (and imported) products. The Ministry of Health inspects 
food service establishments.  Testing of agricultural produce occurs after 
the fact and, with no viable traceability system in place, its effectiveness is 
uncertain.  Monitoring hundreds of thousands of small, often family-owned 
food processing businesses falls on local ofﬁ  cials who lack the incentive and 
training necessary to enforce laws and standards.
Many food companies wanting strict safety assurances maintain their own 
safety assurance programs instead of relying on Government safety stan-
dards, programs, and labels.  Assuring safety, however, is relatively costly 
compared with China’s efﬁ  cient but unregulated domestic marketing.  
Instructing the thousands of households that produce for a given processor/
supplier, monitoring their actions over the growing season, and monitoring 
the integrity of the marketing chain is costly. Companies with a high stake in 
safety assurances often resort to a vertically integrated model.  This model 
may include leasing land from village collectives to produce products with 
hired labor and technical managers.  This can be a tiresome process that 
involves negotiating with village ofﬁ  cials, who act as agents for farm house-
holds to aggregate land into ﬁ  elds to form a viable production base.  For 
products consumed fresh and prone to safety issues, such as leafy vegetables, 
these bases may be fenced off to reduce animal or other contaminations and 
monitored by around-the-clock hired workers.  The produce is typically 
harvested by hired workers and shipped directly to company facilities to be 
processed.32
While the vertically integrated production and marketing model is much 
more expensive than relying on the traditional marketing system, produce 
from China under this system is still competitively priced in export markets 
such as Korea and Japan.  For companies producing for the domestic market, 
such practices are still too expensive.  Acquiring production bases and 
producing products with hired workers entails premium prices to cover the 
32 Hired workers may come from the 
very households renting their land to 
the company; often this is part of the 
rental arrangement. 25
China’s Ongoing Agricultural Modernization: Challenges Remain After 30 Years of Reform / EIB-51
Economic Research Service/USDA
costs of added safety assurances that exceed what most domestic consumers 
are willing to pay. 33
Chinese ofﬁ  cials have adopted a version of the vertically integrated model 
to promote as a safety system for domestic production.  This version links 
a processing or packing company with a “production base” of small farm 
contractors.  Many of the links are established by Government agencies 
who select the processing or packing company according to certain criteria, 
including the capacity to provide agricultural technology and training to 
farmers, and these companies get preferential treatment from local govern-
ments (i.e., loans and access to land) in establishing production bases.  The 
companies provide or specify seed varieties, livestock breeds, chemical 
inputs and application practices, and veterinary drugs to the production 
bases, and production from the bases is delivered to the company.  This 
“company + production base + standard” model may be easier to monitor 
and allow traceability compared with traditional supply chains. It is also 
less expensive than the model used by many exporters, in which land is 
rented and farmed by hired workers.  China’s AQSIQ requires that exported 
products vulnerable to safety hazards be produced in the vertically inte-
grated model, inspecting and certifying export companies and their produc-
tion bases, although most exporters have already adopted such practices.34  
Authorities are also cracking down on production of substandard agricultural 
chemicals and feeds, banning production of some foods in areas that fail 
environmental testing, promoting farm record-keeping, and establishing 
product traceability systems.
The policy whereby the Government selects ﬁ  rms for loans and assistance 
in developing production bases means the Government rather than market 
competition is choosing which ﬁ  rms will be successful.  As such, it will not 
be as efﬁ  cient as market outcomes, but it does provide coordination in an 
environment where coordination comes at a high premium.  
China’s ability to control food safety hazards and increase conﬁ  dence in 
its products—for both domestic and export markets—has implications for 
producers and consumers in the United States.  When products from China 
suffer food safety-related setbacks in other countries, U.S. producers of those 
products may have an opportunity to supply those markets.35  Alternatively, 
successfully reassuring consumers of the safety of products from China 
will help China compete with U.S. producers in both third-country markets 
and in the United States.36  As China increases the stringency of its food 
safety enforcement, however, the costs of producing and marketing its 
agricultural products will rise, eroding China’s cost advantage in interna-
tional markets.  It will also take time to establish conﬁ  dence and integrity in 
China’s marketing and safety system, which gives U.S. producers a niche by 
promoting their products as safe and high quality.
Rural Income and Development Policies
Rapid economic development invariably brings about changes in agricul-
ture, and China is no exception to this rule.37  While rural China was ﬁ  rst to 
beneﬁ  t from economic reforms due to the take-off of agriculture and rural 
enterprises, the locus of growth shifted to urban areas in the late 1980s.  By 
the mid-1990s, urban incomes were roughly three times higher than rural 
33 Again, the price companies can 
charge for safety assurances is limited 
by consumers’ conﬁ  dence in these as-
surances in China, where counterfeit-
ing and mislabeling are not uncom-
mon.
34 Many of the foreign-owned com-
panies or joint ventures with foreign 
companies have much more stringent 
standards than China’s own certiﬁ  ca-
tion requirements.
35 Sometimes food safety-related set-
backs, however, reduce overall demand 
for those products in the affected coun-
tries and adversely affect all imports 
regardless of origin. 
36 U.S. imports from China would 
also compete with U.S. producers, but 
beneﬁ  t U.S. consumers as well.
37 Economically, agriculture suffers 
from declining relative prices as a 
country develops and industrializes 
because additional income is spent on 
nonagricultural products over agricul-
tural products.  In addition, agriculture 
must compete for resources from the 
faster growing sectors.  26
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incomes (ﬁ  g. 11).38  Policymakers responded with a series of programs to 
narrow the income gap.  Each year between 2004 and 2009, China’s State 
Council issued a series of documents offering an array of policy measures 
and plans to improve incomes and living standards in the countryside.  Rural 
income growth accelerated during this period but urban incomes grew even 
faster, and the policies were not able to narrow the urban-rural income gap.  
Eliminating Taxes 
In the ﬁ  rst two decades after reforms, China taxed farmers through price 
policies as well as explicit taxes and fees. Prices paid for grain quota deliv-
eries to State marketing bureaus were well below market prices, implicitly 
taxing farmers.39  In the late 1990s, China reversed this policy by paying 
above-market prices for quota deliveries—an implicit subsidy for farmers.  
Ultimately, by the early 2000s, China eliminated the grain quota system 
altogether.  
China also established local taxes and fees after HRS to help fund village 
government, infrastructure, schools, and health care facilities.40  As with 
most rural policies in China, the level and means of assessing taxes and fees 
varied widely from village to village.  Fiscal changes in the 1990s eliminated 
many intergovernmental transfers, and a slowdown in the rural economy 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s left many rural governments with a thin 
tax base. Many villages began assessing various fees and taxes on farmers 
to fund local services (ﬁ  g. 12).  The rising tax burden on farmers became a 
major policy issue.  After several years of experimentation, China began a 
nationwide push to phase out agricultural taxes in 2004, and taxes on farmers 
were eliminated by 2006 (ﬁ  g. 12).41  
Figure 11
Urban incomes exceed rural incomes in China
1978        1981         1984         1987         1990         1993         1996          1999         2002         2005         2008
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38 Rural residents must pay fees for 
education and health care services that 
are of inferior quality compared with 
subsidized services provided to many 
urban residents.
39 China also provided some inputs, 
however, such as fertilizers, at subsi-
dized prices over some of the period.
40 Farm households in China have a 
long history of paying local taxes and 
fees based on land area and other fac-
tors and activities.  
41 There is some evidence that the 
elimination of taxes accelerated land 
reallocation for nonagricultural devel-
opment as a means for local govern-
ment to generate revenue to replace the 
lost tax revenues.27
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Subsidies, Investments, and Price Supports  
In recent years, China initiated a wide range of programs and subsidies 
aimed at rural areas (Gale, Lohmar, and Tuan, 2005).  In 2004, China began 
to pay direct subsidies to farmers and expendtitures have grown rapidly 
(table 2).  Subsidies now include payments to grain producers, subsidies for 
improved dairy breeds, hog breeding farms, and large poultry farms, insur-
ance for breeding sows, quality seeds, and machinery purchases.  A subsidy 
to compensate farmers for rising fertilizer and fuel prices was initiated in 
2007.  More general rural development programs include construction of 
rural roads, irrigation projects, support for rural schools, a new rural coopera-
tive health care system, worker training, support for elderly and low-income 
households, and subsidies for the purchase of household appliances and elec-
tronic items. The central Government reported spending nearly $87 billion 
on rural programs in 2008, a 37 percent increase from 2007.
An increase in grain production coincided with the establishment of a 
subsidy program. Since prices also rose over much of this period, it is 
unclear what the net effect of subsidies was on farmers’ crop choices and 
yields.  Moreover, oilseed production dropped over the last few years, in 
part, because oilseed acreage was drawn into grain production. This contrib-
uted to a surge in soybean and vegetable oil imports.  
In addition to direct subsidies, China introduced price supports for wheat 
and rice in key grain-producing provinces in 2004.42  If the market price 
falls below a minimum price set by authorities, designated grain enterprises 
(mostly State-owned) will purchase grain from farmers at the minimum 
price. Loans from the China Agricultural Development Bank to ﬁ  nance 
these purchases exceeded $9 billion (U.S. dollars) for 2006.  The grain is 
stored and later offered for auction at provincial grain exchanges. Wheat 
Figure 12
China’s grain taxes have given way to subsidies in recent years
  1997                 1999                 2001                 2003                2005                2007
Note: Ratio of tax and subsidy to cash production cost for producers of rice, wheat, and corn.
Source:  Economic Research Service calculations based on National Development 
and Reform Commission data.
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42 The minimum procurement price 
was ﬁ  rst implemented for rice in 2004 
and extended to wheat in 2005.28
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accounted for most of the purchases under this program until the Government 
announced large purchases of corn, soybeans, cotton, rice, sugar, and rubber 
to support prices in late 2008. 
Rural Credit   
Rural ﬁ  nancial institutions are riddled with bad loans that were extended to 
rural businesses, governments, and grain bureaus, but most farmers in China 
do not participate in formal credit programs (Gale and Collender, 2006).43  In 
recent years, the Government has made reform of the rural ﬁ  nancial system 
a priority. One goal of the reforms is to restore ﬁ  nancial health to nearly 
insolvent rural institutions. The over-arching goal of rural ﬁ  nancial reform is 
to push more capital to farmers through a massive increase in rural loans to 
farmers, agribusinesses, and rural development projects (Gale, 2009).
Since 2003, a complex program was put in place to reorganize, rename, and 
consolidate 40,000 tiny rural credit cooperatives into credit unions, coopera-
tive banks, and commercial banks. Thousands of ofﬁ  cials have been mobi-
lized to conduct village-wide credit checks and organize borrowing groups to 
ensure that small, short-term loans of roughly 5,000 yuan ($715 U.S. dollars) 
each are repaid. A postal savings bank that opened in 2007 was expected to 
engage largely in rural micro-lending. Pilot programs are formalizing here-
tofore illegal underground lenders, who account for most rural lending, and 
allowing city commercial banks and foreign banks to open small “village 
banks” and loan companies. Statistics show large increases in rural lending, 
yet farmers seem to have little access to formal ﬁ  nancial markets.
Many rural investments have the potential to increase agricultural produc-
tivity, particularly livestock production. However, household-level invest-
ment is hampered by the absence of markets for land and housing.  Since 
land cannot be bought and sold, it cannot function as collateral for loans.44  
Consequently, most farmers have few assets to secure loans, and rural lenders 
resort to elaborate credit guarantee schemes for short-term loans of a few 
Table 2












2004 1.4 0.3 0.01 -   1.8
2005 1.6 0.5 0.04 -   2.1
2006 1.8 0.5 0.08   1.5   3.9
2007 2.0 0.7 0.26   3.6   6.6
2008 2.2 1.5 0.58   9.2 13.9
2009* 2.2 1.8 1.46 10.4 17.5
Notes: Values converted to U.S. dollars at average exchange rate for each year.  
Subsidies for inputs other than seeds and machinery did not begin until 2006.
*Announced February 2, 2009.
Source: Economic Research Service calculations based on Ministry of Agriculture 
data.
43 It is not clear whether this is because 
they have difﬁ  culty obtaining formal 
credit or whether they prefer other 
means to support investments.
44 Houses can technically be sold, and 
the lease to the collectively owned land 
they occupy can be transferred to the 
new owner, but houses are explicitly 
not allowed as collateral in rural China. 
New initiatives allow forest rights, or-
chard land, and agricultural marketing 
contracts to be used as loan collateral. 29
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hundred dollars.  Small farmers and entrepreneurs typically rely on their own 
savings, underground lenders, and relatives for small short-term loans.
Technology Development and Promotion
Investments in agricultural research and technology contributed to China’s 
agricultural production gains.  Since employment of land and labor in agri-
cultural production has been stagnant or negative over the last 30 years, a 
large portion of China’s agricultural growth has come from productivity 
growth due to new technologies or specialization that uses resources more 
efﬁ  ciently.45  Studies show that research and new technologies released 
by the national agricultural research system were important components of 
productivity growth (ﬁ  g. 13), particularly since specialization has only just 
begun in China (Fan and Pardey, 1997; Colby, Diao, and Somwaru, 2000; Jin 
et al., 2007).
While agricultural research spending has taken off in recent years, a number 
of factors may constrain further development and adoption of new varieties, 
breeds, and techniques.  China’s large agricultural research expenditure is 
almost entirely publicly funded; private research has been slow to develop.  
This cautious approach since 2002 has delayed approval of a number of 
seed varieties developed using biotech techniques. Only Bt cotton and a few 
varieties of tomatoes and ﬂ  owers have been approved for commercial use.  
China’s agricultural extension service is weak, and extension stations that 
are expected to be self-supporting pursue a mix of commercial and educa-
tional objectives that sometimes conﬂ  ict.  China has a portfolio of biofuel 
technology research, but grain-based biofuel development has been capped 
due to food security concerns, and most nongrain biofuel projects are still in 
experimental stages. Biofuels are heavily subsidized and licenses to sell it 
have been tightly controlled; private companies have mostly been excluded. 
Figure 13
Agricultural research expenditures are rising in China
  1991                1994                 1997                 2000                2003               2005
*Constant 2005 Chinese yuan (CNY) – total spending does not include private enterprises, 
but includes funds raised by universities and Government research institutes outside of 
direct Government outlays.
Source:  Hu et al., 2007.
Billion CNY (yuan)*






45 In addition to increased applications 
of fertilizer and other inputs, which in 
many cases go hand-in-hand with the 
use of high-yielding seed varieties.30
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Agricultural Research 
China’s agricultural research system is dominated by public funding. During 
the 1990s, only about 1 percent of all research funding came from private 
sources. That percentage has likely increased since then, but is still small.  
While China has as many as 10,000 seed companies, less than 100 have 
enough resources to carry out their own research.  Counterfeiting and inad-
equate property rights protection diminish incentives for private companies 
to develop new seeds.  These concerns also discourage multinational seed 
companies from entering China’s large market. Government efforts in live-
stock breeding are part of the country’s overall investment in agricultural 
research, but fall far behind that of plant technology development (ﬁ  g. 13).  
China has been active in importing foreign genetic stock for cross-breeding 
with domestic animals. Increased use of manufactured feed provided by 
foreign-invested and other private enterprises has contributed to signiﬁ  cant 
feeding efﬁ  ciency of China’s livestock production in recent years. 
Biotechnology  
China beneﬁ  ts from investments in biotechnology and recently established a 
program to boost development of biotech varieties.  In the late 1990s, farmers 
began to adopt Bt cotton, and today nearly two-thirds of China’s cotton is 
a Bt variety.  Because Bt cotton is resistant to bollworm and requires only 
about half the pesticide applications of nonbiotech varieties, adoption of Bt 
cotton lowers pesticide and labor costs and provides clear health beneﬁ  ts to 
farmers from lower exposure to pesticides (Huang et al., 2002).  China has 
also commercialized biotech varieties of several horticultural crops, but the 
area sown to these crops is very small.46  
Despite having invested funds into the development of biotech varieties, 
which resulted in promising varieties, China is still hesitant to release biotech 
seeds for basic food crops due to concerns about their reception in export 
markets and potential effects on human health.47  Recent surveys, however, 
indicate that less than 40 percent of China’s urban consumers had any under-
standing of what biotechnology was, but 50-65 percent (depending on the 
food product) supported using such technology (Lin et al., 2006).  Food secu-
rity concerns may push the Government to approve more biotech crops.  
Agricultural Extension Services  
After reforms, China established a vast network of agricultural extension 
ofﬁ  ces at the county and township levels that continued to expand and 
specialize.  By the mid-1990s, the system employed over a million agents.  
Most counties have crop, livestock, agricultural machinery, aquaculture, 
and economic management stations, or centers, and many have established 
specialized substations for plant protection, horticulture, and soil and fertil-
izer technology.  But China’s agricultural extension network suffers from 
efﬁ  ciency problems.  Programs established in the late 1980s to make the 
extension stations partially self-supporting have caused many agents to spend 
time on administrative and commercial activities not related to extension, 
such as work on family planning, budget management, ﬁ  re protection, village 
elections, and legal matters (Hu et al., 2008).
46 Including varieties of tomatoes, 
sweet peppers, chili peppers, and 
petunias.
47 Including corn, which is a food crop 
for some people in China.31
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Agricultural land is limited in China, so the development and extension 
of agricultural technologies will be critical for China to continue produc-
tivity gains.  China has an extensive research system that has contributed to 
productivity growth both inside and outside its borders.48  Further develop-
ment of new varieties, including biotech varieties, will help China continue 
production gains.  Improving the link between the technologies developed in 
the research institutes with the needs of farm households through reforms in 
the extension system will beneﬁ  t overall system performance.  Strengthening 
intellectual property rights would likely spur private investment for devel-
oping new varieties in China and operationalize the technologies developed 
in Government institutes. 
Biofuel 
China initiated its biofuel program in the early 2000s to use up surplus grain 
held in Government reserves, but the program is now viewed as a source 
of alternative fuels and clean energy.  China does not want to miss out on 
technologies that could provide renewable fuel supplies.  China is now the 
world’s fourth-largest producer of fuel ethanol with production from four 
Government-designated plants, using predominantly corn, but also some rice 
and wheat, as feedstocks.  A ﬁ  fth ethanol plant using cassava was opened 
in 2008, and multiple small biodiesel plants are in operation using waste 
cooking oil. 
Because of the conﬂ  ict with grain self-sufﬁ  ciency goals, China has scaled 
back on the ambitious biofuel production goals set out in the 11th Five-Year 
Plan (2006-2011) and may produce only 2-3 mmt of ethanol annually by 
the end of that period.  China is investing in research to develop cellulosic 
ethanol production technology that utilizes nonfood materials (i.e., urban 
waste) or coproducts of food production (i.e., corn stover or straw).  Until 
cellulosic technology is economically viable, China is emphasizing produc-
tion of ethanol and biodiesel from crops, such as cassava, sweet sorghum, 
sweet potatoes, and jatropha, that can be grown on marginal land unsuitable 
for grain production.  A number of demonstration projects using these feed-
stocks are in operation and many others are planned.
Biofuel Policy  
China manages domestic fuel ethanol supply by controlling access to the 
State-owned petroleum industry through a quota system coordinated by 
China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC).  These 
quotas are mandated for selected ethanol production facilities to deliver a 
ﬁ  xed amount of fuel ethanol to the two State-owned petroleum companies 
(Sinopec and PetroChina) in return for a Government subsidy.  All new 
production facilities will use nongrain feedstocks, and the current facilities 
using grain are expected to convert to nongrain feedstocks.49  Some ethanol 
production is exported out of this State-authorized system (both fuel grade 
and hydrous ethanol that is sometimes dehydrated in the receiving country 
or a third country).50  The demand for ethanol is managed by programs in 
selected cities and provinces to use blended E10 (gasoline blended with 10 
percent ethanol) within their jurisdictions. In 2008, E10 was used province-
wide in 6 provinces and in 27 selected cities of 4 other provinces.
48 Many of the traits found in the high-
yield dwarf rice varieties that led to the 
“Green Revolution” in rice throughout 
Asia were initially isolated and devel-
oped in China. 
49 One plant reported switching to cas-
sava in 2008, but then reduced produc-
tion due to high cassava prices.
50 In 2006, China exported 268.9 mil-
lion gallons of ethanol (roughly 0.8 
mmt), about 60 percent of the autho-
rized amount sold to the domestic pe-
troleum industry. Exports fell sharply 
in subsequent years after export tax 
rebates for ethanol were rescinded.32
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The Government controls the development of biofuels. Commercial produc-
tion of biofuels is only proﬁ  table when it receives a subsidy. State-owned 
petroleum companies constitute the only market for biofuel, and the 
Government has so far issued licenses to sell biofuels only to other State-
owned companies.  China is increasingly concerned about the competition 
between biofuel feedstock and food production and has scaled back plans to 
develop noncellulosic biofuels.  Future changes will depend on China’s esti-
mation of the effect of biofuel production on grain availability and prices.
A plant that distills alcohol from cassava in Guangxi Province
Photo by William Coyle, Economic Research Service.33
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Implications for China’s Future Trade
China can have a major impact on world commodity markets, but its trade 
has evolved in surpising ways. Before market-based reforms were initiated 
in 1978, China consistently imported wheat and exported modest amounts 
of rice each year.  Beginning in the 1980s and 1990s, domestic market ﬂ  uc-
tuations were reﬂ  ected in ﬂ  uctuating imports of wheat and exports of corn. 
(ﬁ  g. 14).  Trade in soybeans and cotton cycled between exports and imports. 
Swings in commodity trade, coupled with the opaque nature of China’s 
State-trading monopolies, contributed to uncertainty in world markets.  
It was widely anticipated that China’s WTO accession in December 2001 
would lead to rising grain imports as the Government opened low-tariff 
import quotas for rice, wheat, corn, cotton, sugar, and wool and established a 
more transparent trading process (Lohmar, Hansen, Seeley, and Hsu, 2002). 
However, China remained a net exporter of corn, wheat, and rice in most 
years following WTO accession (Gale, 2005). Corn exports declined as 
excess stocks accumulated in the late 1990s diminished (Gale, 2002; 2004), 
and rice and wheat trade remained small (Lohmar, 2004). China has deﬁ  ed 
most forecasts by becoming an net exporter of grain since the late 1990s. 
China’s impact on world markets has been felt primarily in the soybean 
and cotton sectors. (Tuan, Fang, and Cao, 2004; Gale, 2007). China’s trade 
in these two commodities was modest until the late 1990s, but after WTO 
Figure 14
China’s net exports of grains have fluctuated since 1978
Notes: Negative numbers indicate net imports. Years are “market years” for each commodity.
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accession, imports of soybeans and cotton exploded (ﬁ  g. 15). Their combined 
import total was close to 50 million metric tons (mmt) in 2007/08.  Soybean 
imports reached a record 37 mmt in calendar year 2008. In comparison, net 
exports of corn, wheat, and rice totaled 4 mmt that year.
Fundamental economic forces like resource scarcity, urbanization, and income 
growth will be the main drivers of China’s future trading patterns. China’s 
resource endowment favors import of land-intensive crops and gives it a 
comparative advantage in labor-intensive goods like vegetables, fruits, and 
aquaculture products.  The impact of basic economic forces on trade will be 
inﬂ  uenced by the issues described in the preceding section. China’s liberaliza-
tion, openness to trade and investment, and efﬁ  ciency in meeting its growing 
demand for food and ﬁ  ber will be inﬂ  uenced by how these issues play out.  
The combined forces of economic growth and shifting production toward 
more labor-intensive products will dampen future import and export growth 
in some products.  Continued urbanization and income growth will result 
in lower per capita consumption of food grains such as rice and wheat, but 
greater demand for horticultural products such as fruits and vegetables.  Since 
horticultural products are typically labor-intensive, China is well suited to 
produce them for its domestic market, relying less on imports.51  In addi-
tion, wheat and rice are relatively land-intensive and not produced efﬁ  ciently 
in China relative to other more land-abundant countries.52  But China’s per 
capita demand for these products is falling, and total demand is beginning to 
decline as population growth slows.  Thus, future imports of food grains will 
likely remain small.   
51 China’s export capacity of these 
products will also be affected by do-
mestic consumption growth.
52 Particularly wheat; rice is more 
labor-intensive.
Figure 15
China’s cotton and soybean imports surged after WTO accession
Notes: Negative numbers indicate net imports. Years are “market years” for each commodity.
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Economic growth and urbanization in China has increased demand for live-
stock products as well as textile and clothing products.  Increasing demand 
for these products will drive demand for imports of land-intensive inputs into 
their production:  oilseeds, feed grains, cotton, and hides.53  The net effect of 
China’s economic growth on the derived demand for imports of land-inten-
sive inputs into livestock and textile production, however, will be affected 
by a number of contingencies.  Demand for livestock products will continue 
to grow, but the extent to which additional demand is met with imports of 
livestock products depends on efﬁ  ciency improvements in China’s livestock 
sector and other issues, such as disease outbreaks (both in China and abroad).  
While most observers agree that China’s domestic textile, clothing, and shoe 
consumption is rising, there is scant information on domestic consumption 
for these products. Thus, the extent to which China’s domestic economic 
growth drives cotton and hide imports is unknown.  Moreover, rising wages, 
the appreciating Yuan (CNY), and slowing growth in the world economy 
threaten China’s rapid growth in textile, clothing, and shoe exports.
On top of these fundamental economic trends, issues in resource manage-
ment, market development, improvement of rural incomes, and the devel-
opment and adoption of technology will play a role in China’s production, 
consumption, and trade in agricultural products.  Improving land and water 
management practices will affect production of nearly all crops. Market-
based prices for land and water that reﬂ  ect the scarcity of these resources 
would raise agricultural production costs and induce producers to plant crops 
that use these resources less intensively or crops that bring a higher return.54  
Marketing reforms will improve China’s capacity to produce and market 
crops and livestock products that satisfy market demand with quality, safety, 
standardization, and other attributes that consumers want.  Price support and 
subsidy policies have emphasized grain production at the expense of cash 
crops, dampening market signals to farmers. Rural investment programs 
are improving basic infrastructure and human capital. Increased machinery 
subsidies are encouraging substitution of capital for labor as it becomes more 
expensive.  Technology development and extension would increase the tech-
nological sophistication of all aspects of agriculture in China.
In this section, we examine the factors that will determine China’s future 
trade in key commodities.  Looking at food grains, horticultural products, 
livestock products, feed grains and oilseeds, cotton, hides, and skins sepa-
rately, we brieﬂ  y touch upon past trends and the drivers of those trends, 
including how these drivers may be altered as China’s overall economy 
changes.  The discussion of future trade refers to underlying economic funda-
mentals, as well as resource management policies, development of modern 
marketing practices, efforts to improve rural incomes, and technology devel-
opment, relating them to trends in production and consumption of speciﬁ  c 
commodities.  Moreover, we note China’s past emphasis on the self-sufﬁ  -
ciency of key strategic crops, but also that many formerly strategic crops are 
now fully liberalized and sourced from abroad.  Past liberalization of poli-
cies for formerly strategic crops, such as soybeans and cotton, indicates that 
China is willing to forego self-sufﬁ  ciency when costs are high and the crop is 
not “too strategic.”55  
53 China’s livestock production, pre-
dominantly pork and poultry products, 
is relatively labor-intensive because 
most is backyard production from farm 
households.  Modernization will serve 
to replace labor with capital, but still 
allow China to maintain production 
of livestock products.  Hides from the 
United States are relatively land-inten-
sive because they are produced from 
beef cattle raised on rangeland before 
entering feedlots.
54 Recall how farmers are responding 
to high water pumping costs by mov-
ing to more water-intensive, but also 
more proﬁ  table, horticultural crops--a 
phenomenon that has occurred in other 
regions of water scarcity in the world.
55 Products that are not necessary to 
maintain people’s daily life.36
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Food Grains
Food grains, such as rice and wheat, are fundamentally land-intensive. China 
can utilize its resource base more efﬁ  ciently by devoting more of its limited 
land base to activities that produce greater economic value per unit of land.  
That would entail importing more grains from land-abundant countries and 
exporting more labor-intensive products.  While China has expanded produc-
tion of labor-intensive commodities, it remains self-sufﬁ  cient in rice and 
wheat. Many observers expected rising imports of grain after China’s acces-
sion to WTO, but imports of land-intensive commodities were channeled into 
crops viewed as less vital to food security. The prospects for rice and wheat 
imports are attenuated by stagnant or falling domestic demand as consumers 
shift diets to ﬁ  sh, livestock products, fruits, vegetables, and processed foods.  
As incomes improve beyond a subsistence level, consumers substitute 
other foods for staple grains.  Urbanization is also slowing rice and wheat 
consumption. On average, China’s urban residents consume roughly a third 
the level of food grain as their rural counterparts.  
China’s grain production and demand for imports will be affected by 
improving the resource management and marketing policies discussed previ-
ously.  Policies that pool land to achieve economies of size and scale will 
improve productivity and facilitate mechanization.  Improved water prac-
tices will mitigate stress on water resources, allowing farmers to continue 
irrigated rice and wheat production.  Using land and water resources more 
efﬁ  ciently, however, will induce farmers to move these resources into more 
proﬁ  table crops and may slow the growth of grain production.  While food 
grain products are less vulnerable to the food safety issues that have rocked 
China’s horticultural and livestock product markets, improved marketing will 
enhance the value of high-quality varieties by segregating them from generic 
grains.  Food grain producers are the primary targets of Government policy 
support in the form of direct subsidies, price supports, and publicly supported 
research.
In general, the inﬂ  uence of economic and policy trends is more pronounced 
for wheat than for rice.  We will discuss how these trends affect wheat 
production, consumption, and trade, then follow up with a brief discussion of 
their effects on rice markets.
Wheat 
China is the world’s largest wheat producing country and, in some years, it 
is also a major importer.56  Imports have fallen in recent years due to slow 
consumption growth and a boost in production from yield improvements 
and policy support (Lohmar, 2004).  China’s role in international wheat 
markets will depend on a variety of factors.  Expanding the scale of farms, 
which could result from changes in land policies, may improve efﬁ  ciency 
since wheat production is more easily mechanized than most other farm 
enterprises.  Much of China’s wheat production also depends on irrigation 
in some severely water-stressed regions in northern China, and water has 
much higher value in other uses than irrigated wheat, which could be easily 
purchased from international markets.  China still seeks to maintain near self-
sufﬁ  ciency in wheat production.  Given that China has committed to a more 
liberalized TRQ trade regime than other countries faced at this stage of their 
56 The European Union, which is made 
up of 27 countries and has a common 
agricultural policy, produces more 
wheat than China.37
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development, it is turning to subsidy and price support policies to maintain 
domestic wheat production at levels close to domestic demand.57 
China’s wheat production could gain from efforts to reform the land tenure 
system.58  Pooling land facilitates mechanization and standardization and 
reduces farmers’ transportation time to multiple ﬁ  elds and other production 
costs.  Large plots would also facilitate more commercial, rather than semi-
subsistence, production practices (e.g., use of purchased seed rather than 
saved seed).59  More commercial production would induce farmers to inves-
tigate input quality more carefully and demand quality guarantees, which 
would help shake-out counterfeiting and other abuses in the under-regulated 
seed and chemical input industries and improve yields overall.  Larger plots 
would also facilitate the substitution of capital for labor (such as harvesting 
with combines), increasing overall efﬁ  ciency, while larger plots with more 
secure rights would increase farmers’ incentive to invest in long-term produc-
tivity enhancement.  For example, investing in land leveling would improve 
water conservation and yields in China’s irrigated wheat production.
While both wheat and rice production in China is heavily irrigated, wheat 
production is concentrated in areas with greater water stress and will be more 
vulnerable to water shortages.  Wheat yields in China are much higher than 
world averages and the United States because of widespread irrigation.  The 
Hai, Huai, and Huang (Yellow) River Basins are China’s primary wheat belt, 
with as much as 70 percent of wheat production occurring in that area.60  
Not only does this area have limited water supplies, but the rainfall that does 
occur is concentrated between July and September and cannot support winter 
wheat that grows from October to June.  Thus, most wheat production in the 
region requires supplemental irrigation.61  As surface water systems dry up 
or become more unreliable, farmers are turning to ground water to irrigate 
wheat as ground water tables fall in large parts of the region.  Since wheat is 
a low-valued user of water, falling groundwater tables or other conservation 
policies that raise the cost of water for irrigation will decrease wheat produc-
tion in the region.
Reforming marketing policies to establish segregation, traceability, or more 
integrity of the overall system will have some effect on wheat trade, but not 
large.  Grains are, by nature, less vulnerable to contamination from pesti-
cide residues or organic material because they are covered by a husk and 
grow well above the ground.  The State-owned grain marketing system in 
China, however, was costly, inefﬁ  cient, and believed to lose a signiﬁ  cant 
percentage of the grain crop through inadequate storage practices that led to 
spoilage.62  The system was also geared to homogenous quality, and China’s 
rapidly expanding food processing industry increasingly demands speciﬁ  c 
qualities, such as protein and gluten characteristics, to make its food prod-
ucts, particularly for wheat (Lohmar, Wilson, and Bu, 2006).  In the past, the 
demand for wheat with speciﬁ  c quality characteristics resulted in demand 
for imports since those characteristics could not be reliably procured from 
domestic producers.  Future marketing reforms, particularly the increasing 
role of private grain traders, will help establish niche marketing for wheat 
with speciﬁ  c quality characteristics. China’s seed breeders are also devel-
oping more varieties with the characteristics in demand by food processors.63  
Marketing reforms may encourage more open attitudes toward reporting 
stock levels.  Private traders can beneﬁ  t from information on local and 
57 Other countries, such as South Ko-
rea and Japan, raised tariffs and other 
import barriers for grains to maintain 
domestic production when they were 
at similar stages of economic develop-
ment.  But China is committed to a 
TRQ regime and also appears more 
sensitive to high grain prices, caus-
ing increased reliance on subsidies.  
China’s TRQ on wheat, however, is the 
most restrictive of all the products un-
der TRQs (see box, “China’s Histori-
cal Grain Trade and WTO Accession”). 
58 This is true for the production of all 
grains and even horticultural products 
and cash crops in China.
59 Farmers in China are increasingly 
producing for the market rather than 
for their own consumption.  Roughly 
40 percent of China’s wheat is mar-
keted some time over the year, with the 
remaining 60 percent consumed by the 
household or traded with neighbors.
60 And an even higher percentage of 
wheat that goes to market in China.
61 An estimated 60-70 percent of wheat 
sown area is irrigated in this region 
and, since irrigated yields are much 
higher than rainfed yields, a far higher 
percentage of production depends on 
irrigation.
62 The grain marketing system has 
long suffered from overstafﬁ  ng and 
ﬁ  nancial losses. China Grain Bureau 
statistics show that State-owned 
grain enterprises cut employment by 
2.36 million from 1998 to 2006, but 
still employed 948,500 in 2006 and 
incurred losses of over 3 billion yuan 
($375 million) (Nie, pp. 39-40).  State-
owned grain marketing companies now 
carry out price support programs.
63 Farmer’s purchases of these seeds 
are typically subsidized by the seed 
subsidy program.38
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national stock levels and make more informed buying and selling decisions.  
Stock level information will also help reduce the uncertainty that has long 
characterized China’s participation in international grain trade.
Agricultural policy will still play a role in China’s wheat trade.  Direct subsi-
dies and price supports have encouraged farmers to keep producing wheat 
even though it consistently brings the lowest proﬁ  ts among major crops 
in China.  The Government accumulated large reserves when it purchased 
wheat to support prices during 2006-08.  In the spring and summer of 2008, 
when world wheat prices were 40 percent above China’s wheat price, China 
held large wheat reserves that could have been exported at a substantial proﬁ  t 
without disrupting domestic markets.  Instead, ofﬁ  cials cut off most grain 
exports by restricting export quotas, eliminating an export tax rebate, and 
assessing a temporary export tax on wheat and other grains. China’s wheat 
exports plunged from 2.3 million metric tons during calendar year 2007 to 
125,000 metric tons in 2008, the lowest total since 1999.
Rice  
China is the world’s largest rice producer and consumer and net rice exporter 
in most years.  This trend is projected to continue.  China generally imports 
high-quality Jasmine rice and exports relatively low-quality Indica rice.  
When rural people move to cities, they tend to reduce their rice consumption 
as their diets become more diversiﬁ  ed.  Rice production uses large amounts 
of irrigation water, but it is mainly grown in southern China where rainfall 
and surface water are abundant.  Rice is more labor-intensive than other 
grains, and rice production may be affected by continued rising labor costs in 
China.  
Japonica rice produced in northeastern China is preferred by many urban 
consumers, and some is exported to Korea and Japan where it competes 
with exports from California.  Some Chinese rice is also exported to Puerto 
Rico. China’s primary rice exports are low-quality Indica varieties that go 
to markets in West Africa, Southeast Asia, and Central Asia.  China’s rice 
imports consist mainly of premium-priced Jasmine rice from Thailand.
Horticultural Products
China’s horticultural production has boomed in the last 10 years (Huang 
and Gale, 2006).  Growth in horticultural production is largely in response 
to China’s growing domestic demand for these products, but exports have 
increased as well, particularly since WTO accession (ﬁ  g. 16).64  China is 
ﬁ  nding markets for its fruit, vegetable, and processed products exports all 
over the world, including Japan, South Korea, the EU, the United States, 
Russia, and Southeast Asia.65  The growth in China’s horticultural exports 
has been slowed by food safety concerns in recent years.  Continued food 
safety concerns may dampen China’s capacity to continue export growth 
of fruit, vegetable, and processed products, particularly to more lucrative, 
higher income countries.66  Developing modern marketing chains that can 
provide greater safety assurances will help China overcome problems in 
export markets and increase domestic consumers’ conﬁ  dence in horticultural 
products.
64 Exports are still a small fraction 
of China’s total production of these 
products.
65 Many exported horticultural prod-
ucts are processed products, such as 
juices and canned, dried, pickled or 
frozen fruits and vegetables.
66 Exports to Japan—China’s largest 
food export market—plunged in 2008 
after pesticide-contaminated dump-
lings sickened Japanese consumers and 
eroded conﬁ  dence in foods imported 
from China.39
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Other issues may serve to slow growth in horticultural production.  China’s 
continued economic growth increases wages in rural areas, eroding the prof-
itability of labor-intensive crops.  In other countries, horticultural produc-
tion often relies on migrant labor: workers that arrive in time for the busy 
season, typically for harvest and processing, then move away until the next 
year.  These types of periodic labor markets have yet to develop in China, 
constraining many regions to cultivate only as much labor-intensive crops 
as they can harvest with local, sometimes household, labor resources.67  
Subsidies provided to grain producers may serve to limit land going into 
horticultural production, but thus far these subsidies are insufﬁ  cient to make 
grains, on average, even remotely as proﬁ  table as horticultural crops.
Other policy changes may promote horticultural production in China.  
Reforming land tenure and credit policies may increase the efﬁ  ciency of 
China’s horticultural production, cause farmers to shift production to horti-
cultural crops, and even help China resolve food safety issues in horticultural 
products.  Clarifying land rights to make land transactions more market-
based would raise the opportunity cost of the land and induce farmers to 
shift land to higher value uses (similar to water).  Land tenure policies that 
allow farmers to specialize and aggregate land into horticultural production 
will reduce costs and improve standardization.  The development of farmer 
organizations could also serve this role.  Both larger farms and farmer orga-
nizations, independently or together, would help producers bargain with 
marketing agents and processors to receive a larger share of the value of their 
production, facilitating rural income goals.  Policies to provide credit for farm 
households may also help facilitate more modern production practices.
Livestock Products
As with horticultural products, China’s consumption of livestock products 
has grown rapidly in recent years, and these products are predominantly 
67 This also causes households and re-
gions to produce multiple horticultural 
crops with different harvesting and 
processing needs so they can sequence 
these busy seasons, rather than special-
ize in one or two crops.  
Figure 16
China’s exports of horticultural products grew rapidly after 2001*
 1995  1996   1997   1998  1999   2000  2001  2002   2003  2004   2005  2006  2007
*Date of China’s WTO accession.
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supplied by domestic producers.  China’s consumption of pork, poultry, 
beef, and ﬁ  sh will continue to grow as incomes and urbanization increase.  
Per capita meat consumption by China’s wealthiest households, however, 
appears to have peaked at relatively low levels (Gale and Huang, 2007).  
These low levels of consumption in China’s high-income groups suggest 
that the potential for greater meat consumption may be weaker than indi-
cated by forecasts that used per capita consumption in other developed Asian 
countries as their benchmark.  Food safety concerns and outbreaks of animal 
diseases periodically disrupt meat, poultry, dairy, and ﬁ  sh consumption and 
could be a limiting factor for growth in both production and consumption.68
Despite growing domestic demand, China has been a net exporter of live-
stock products in most years (ﬁ  g. 17).  China imports mostly livestock prod-
ucts that are low-value in the United States, such as chicken feet, wing tips, 
and offal. Pork imports surged temporarily between 2007 and 2008 when 
China’s hog sector experienced a severe downturn, but pork imports are 
minimal in most years. China also imports some dairy products.  Demand for 
beef is growing, but China has not imported beef directly from the United 
States since the December 2003 discovery of BSE in a dairy cow in the 
United States.  China also exports poultry, pork, and aquaculture products.  
Production tends to expand and contract cyclically in response to price ﬂ  uc-
tuations and periodic disease outbreaks.  Ofﬁ  cials in many areas promote 
livestock production as a rural development program, but many farmers 
are abandoning traditional “backyard” modes of livestock production.  The 
emergence of large Chinese meat and dairy companies in recent years has 
pushed development of more modern livestock production by large- and 
small-scale farms. 69
68 The 2004 outbreak of avian inﬂ  u-
enza in China caused Chinese poultry 
consumption to fall signiﬁ  cantly, even 
though humans cannot contract the 
disease from eating cooked poultry 
products.
69 A recent report by China’s Ministry 
of Agriculture states that roughly half 
of China’s pork production comes 
from producers with 50 head or more, 
a much larger percentage than only a 
few years ago. 
Figure 17
China’s net exports of beef, pork, and poultry
1988      1990      1992       1994        1996        1998        2000        2002         2004      2006      2008
Note: Negative numbers indicate net imports.
Source:  U.S. Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, Production, 
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China’s transformation from predominantly backyard production to more 
modern production facilities operated at the village level will be facilitated 
directly by the availability of rural credit and development and extension 
of technology.  A small share of livestock production is produced in large, 
fully modernized production facilities with temperature-controlled buildings, 
compound feeds, and use of growth hormones, particularly in poultry produc-
tion.70  Household production is increasingly seen by policymakers as inef-
ﬁ  cient, and the waste from these operations contributes to environmental and 
water quality issues in rural areas.  Thus, the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) 
is engaged in a program to facilitate the consolidation of these efforts at the 
village level to improve their technological sophistication and curtail envi-
ronmental effects.  Increased availability of rural credit will assist in these 
efforts.
Other efforts to improve livestock production efﬁ  ciency include develop-
ment and importation of improved breeds.  China’s research institutions put 
less emphasis on developing livestock varieties than on seed varieties, but 
China has imported breeding stock to cross with domestic breeds in an effort 
to improve their weight gain performance and meat quality.  These enhance-
ments, along with the MOA’s attempts to improve the sophistication of 
production at the village level, will increase China’s production efﬁ  ciency in 
livestock products.
Oilseeds and Feed Grains
As China’s livestock production grows and develops, the demand for feed 
grains and protein meals will almost certainly increase.  Given China’s 
emphasis on maintaining self-sufﬁ  ciency for food grains, the production of 
food grains will likely take precedence over the production of feed grains and 
oilseeds.  Oilseed imports are already large after skyrocketing over the last 
decade.  China has long been a corn exporter, but corn exports have fallen 
and imports could occur more regularly.
Oilseeds  
Oilseeds and vegetable oils are among China’s most important imports. 
China’s soybean imports were negligible in the mid-1990s and reached 37 
million metric tons during calendar year 2008.  Soybean imports totaled 
$21.8 billion in 2008, including $8.4 billion from the United States, and 
imports of fats and oils totaled $10.8 billion (U.S. dollars). Vegetable 
oil imports include palm oil from Southeast Asia and soybean oil from 
Argentina, Brazil, and the United States. China’s soybean import boom has 
been driven by demands for vegetable oil and soymeal as a high-protein 
component of animal feed.71  The rising demand for vegetable oil and live-
stock feed is expected to continue, and China will rely on imports to meet 
this demand.  
Research institutes in China are developing biotech soybean varieties, 
but unlike the United States and Brazil—the world’s two largest soybean 
producers and China’s primary suppliers for soybeans—China’s Government 
has yet to approve any of these varieties for production.  Yields for China’s 
domestically developed biotech soybeans lag behind internationally avail-
able varieties, and this lag is one reason why China has yet to approve 
70 Many of these hormones are legally 
banned in China, but illegal use is 
common. 
71 Until recently, China was a net ex-
porter of soymeal, but still an importer 
of soyoil, indicating that the recent 
growth in soybean imports was driven 
more by demand for soyoil than for 
soymeal.  42
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domestic varieties. There are also concerns, however, over the effects of 
biotech soybeans in direct human consumption.  Most of China’s domesti-
cally produced soybeans are used to make tofu and other food products.72  
Once China improves its domestic biotech varieties to match internationally 
available biotech varieties, these varieties will likely be approved for produc-
tion.  If China were to adopt biotech varieties that match current yields, the 
adoption of these varieties would lower production costs and make soybeans 
more proﬁ  table, resulting in expanded acreage, higher domestic production, 
and lower demand for imports.  The expanded acreage, however, would 
divert acreage from corn production, possibly increasing the demand for corn 
imports.
Policy support for grains affects China’s production of oilseeds. Price 
supports and subsidy policies for grain shifted crop plantings from soybeans 
and rapeseed to corn, wheat, and early rice in 2007. Thus, support for grain 
is one factor behind the surge in oilseed and vegetable oil imports.  In 2008, 
China expanded price supports and subsidies for soybeans and rapeseed to 
spur a recovery in oilseed production.
Corn 
China is the world’s second largest corn producer (the United States is 
largest). Its corn consumption for animal feed and industrial uses has been 
growing faster than that of rice and wheat.73  Production has risen as well, 
as grain area shifted from food grains to corn. Despite growing demand, 
China has not imported signiﬁ  cant quantities of corn since the mid-1990s. 
China’s corn exports ﬂ  uctuate from year-to-year, depending on Chinese poli-
cies and trends in international versus domestic prices (Gale, 2002; 2004). 
Chinese corn competes directly with U.S. corn in South Korea and other 
Asian markets.  China’s continued increase in corn consumption for feed and 
industrial uses will curb China’s corn exports and may turn China into a corn 
importer. 
Industry estimates suggest that corn use for animal feed has been growing at 
a moderate pace.  Livestock feed accounts for about two-thirds of China’s 
corn demand.  Revised statistics released in 2008 by China’s National 
Bureau of Statistics indicate that meat production rose about 3 percent per 
year from 1997 to 2007.  Farmers in China primarily raise hogs and poultry, 
which convert grain to meat more efﬁ  ciently than beef cattle.  Corn accounts 
for approximately 30 percent of total livestock feed. Chinese farmers use a 
variety of other feeds, including wheat, rice, bran from milling these grains, 
sweet potatoes, ﬁ  sh meal, oilseed meals, and byproducts from starch and 
alcohol production.  Chinese cattle and sheep graze in pastures, at the edge 
of ﬁ  elds, and near roadsides, consuming relatively little grain.  Because 
of the variety of feeds used, farmers are sensitive to corn-feed prices.  
Livestock production, however, is modernizing and the share produced by 
individual households is falling as China shifts to more commercial opera-
tions.  Commercial operations rely more on corn and soybean feeds, but 
also improve the conversion ratios to reduce feed demand per unit of meat 
produced.  Current policies to extend credit to rural areas may facilitate the 
modernization of the livestock sector and have spillover effects in the corn 
and soybean markets.  
72 China also exports a small amount 
of soybeans for human consumption, 
including those exported to the United 
States. 
73 In recent years, the fastest growing 
component of corn demand in China 
has been for industrial production of 
starches, corn sweetener, and alcohol.43
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Corn yields in China have signiﬁ  cant capacity to improve, much more than 
for wheat and rice.  China’s corn yields are less than 5 metric tons per hectare 
(2 mt/acre), far below the United States with yields closer to 9 metric tons per 
hectare (3.6 mt/acre).  Thus, the development and adoption of new, higher 
yielding varieties could signiﬁ  cantly improve China’s total corn produc-
tion.74  Improved agricultural technologies, including biotech varieties of 
corn, could boost corn yields and stave off import demand.75  Improved 
extension services and seed industry regulation could facilitate the develop-
ment and dissemination of newly developed varieties.  Larger plots or devel-
opment of viable producer associations could also facilitate the adoption of 
improved varieties by lowering research costs or raising the aggregate beneﬁ  t 
of selecting improved varieties.
Cotton, Hides, and Skins
Another major area of agricultural imports for China in recent years has 
been inputs into the world’s largest textile, clothing, and shoe manufacturing 
industry.  China’s production of these products not only serves the growing 
demand of 1.3 billion increasingly wealthy consumers, but also produces the 
world’s largest exports of these products.  China’s export of these products 
grew throughout the 1990s, then surged after WTO accession in 2001.76  
While China is by far the world’s largest consumer of these inputs, it is 
unclear how much goes into products sold domestically versus how much is 
re-exported, and this is a major component of uncertainty on international 
markets for these agricultural inputs.
Exchange-rate adjustment, rising labor costs in China, and slowing growth 
in the global economy, may affect imports of cotton, hides, and skins.  After 
holding its exchange rate ﬁ  xed for over a decade, China began allowing its 
currency to ﬂ  oat upward against the dollar in July 2005 (Gale and Tuan, 
2007).  In the ensuing 3 years, the Chinese Yuan (CNY) gradually appreci-
ated about 20 percent against the dollar, raising the cost of exports from 
China.  At the same time, China’s labor costs have been rising at double 
digit rates and enforcement of labor and environmental regulations has been 
tightened, further eroding China’s international competitiveness in labor-
intensive industries like textile and shoe manufacturing.  These factors could 
slow China’s export growth and temper China’s demand for cotton and 
hide imports.  A lack of reliable statistics on domestic Chinese textile and 
shoe production, however, has made it difﬁ  cult to assess whether growth in 
demand by China’s domestic consumers will keep its production boom going.
Cotton 
China has been a major cotton importer since WTO accession in late 2001, 
particularly since the end of the MFA in 2004.  Under China’s WTO obliga-
tions, cotton is imported under a Tariff-Rate Quota (TRQ) regime similar to 
grains.  Starting in 2003, however, China has imported cotton well beyond its 
890,000 mt TRQ without imposing the prohibitive 40 percent out-of-quota 
tariff, providing support to its surging textile industry.77  Cotton imports were 
2 million mt or more each year from 2004 to 2008, and peaked at 3.6 million 
mt in 2006.
74 Much of China’s corn on the North 
China Plain, however, is double-
cropped with winter wheat or veg-
etable crops and planted in June rather 
than in the spring, creating a much 
shorter growing season than U.S. corn.
75 China has developed biotech corn 
varieties, but has yet to release them.
76 China’s WTO accession in 2001 
allowed China to be included when 
the Multiﬁ  ber Arrangement (MFA) 
was lifted in December 2004 which, 
until that time, imposed quotas on 
China’s and other WTO member’s 
exports of textile products to devel-
oped countries.  Since 2001, China’s 
textile exports have tripled, resulting in 
soaring demand for cotton, hides, and 
skins as inputs into this manufacturing 
bonanza.
77 China has instead applied a com-
plex “sliding scale” tariff on imports 
beyond the TRQ, which in practice has 
ranged from 5 to 25 percent.44
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China’s domestic cotton production has little capacity to expand unless it 
encroaches on area sown to other crops.  Conversely, grain subsidies and 
other policies to maintain grain production could limit the expansion of 
cotton production in many areas.  China’s cotton production has already 
beneﬁ  ted greatly by biotech Bt cotton varieties that are relatively resistant 
to bollworm, so future gains from technology development will be lower 
than for other crops where such technologies have yet to be adopted.  Cotton 
production in China depends on irrigation, but cotton uses less water than 
grain crops and also grows through the summer rainy season in the eastern 
production region, so it is less sensitive to disruptions in supplemental irriga-
tion than wheat.  Cotton production in the western Xinjiang region depends 
on water from snow pack in the surrounding mountains, and this snow pack 
is widely believed to be threatened by climate change (see ﬁ  g. 9). 
Hides and Skins 
In recent years, China has imported more than 2 mmt of hides and skins 
annually.  The value of hides imported from the United States exceeds 
$800 million annually. Like cotton, these products go into the manufac-
ture of consumer items, primarily shoes and clothing, much of which are 
re-exported.  Since China’s beef industry is signiﬁ  cantly smaller than the 
United States’, demand for hide imports will likely continue.  Processing 
hides and skins, however, can have negative environmental consequences, 
particularly on water quality.  Recent efforts to improve environmental stew-
ardship threaten the continued processing of hides and skins in China.
A ship loaded with containers is berthed at Qingdao, 
China’s leading port for trade in agricultural products
Photo by Fred Gale, Economic Research Service.45
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Conclusion
China has come a long way in the last 30 years.  Since reforms began in 
1978, China has risen out of the inefﬁ  ciencies of planned production and 
marketing to experience one of the longest and most robust periods of 
sustained economic growth in world history.  This fact is even more impres-
sive given China’s large size, and the implications of its rising afﬂ  uence 
reverberate around the world.  As the world’s largest agricultural economy 
with 1.3 billion increasingly wealthy consumers and 200 million farm house-
holds, a ripple in China’s agricultural production or consumption can trans-
late into a wave on world agricultural markets.  
China is entering a new stage in its reform of markets and production prac-
tices.  Agriculture now must supply quality, safety, and other attributes 
rather than just quantity.  The environmental and natural resource costs of 
maintaining high agricultural output are becoming increasingly evident. The 
objective of maximizing economic growth has given way to a more nuanced 
set of goals that focus on income distribution and eroding physical and social 
infrastructure in rural areas.  Ofﬁ  cials now emphasize the importance of 
spreading technology, investment, and education to rural areas. 
These issues stem from China’s enormous success at generating wealth and 
industrial development over the last 30 years and are not unique to China.  
Many of these problems also have market-based solutions, but require more 
modern market-supporting mechanisms, such as clearly deﬁ  ned property 
rights and open, contestable, dispute settlement institutions.  Such modern 
market-supporting institutions, however, are still in their infancy in China.  
The urgency of these problems, coupled with Government’s continued 
tendency toward interventionist solutions that carry over from the collective 
era, results in policy solutions that could be effective, but are not necessarily 
efﬁ  cient, and may not be adaptable to future problems.  Establishing modern 
marketing institutions can help resolve current and future issues; however, 
establishing these institutions is costly and time consuming.  The cost of 
interventionist policies is less expensive, in the short run, because the institu-
tional legacy of the planned economy lends itself to such policies.
China’s future agricultural production, consumption, and trade will depend, 
in part, on how these issues are resolved.  Interventionist policies intended 
to address short-term crises may have unintended long-term consequences. 
In the 1990s, China sharply raised grain prices and pressured farmers to 
increase grain output. The resulting production surge depressed grain prices 
and disrupted markets during 2000-03. Such policies can also postpone 
needed economic adjustments, consequently building up greater pressure. 
Restrictions on rural-urban migration in past decades facilitated urban 
income growth and kept cities free of slums, but it built up a huge reservoir 
of surplus rural labor. The land tenure system preserved short-term stability 
and equality, but it has prevented adjustments needed to commercialize agri-
culture and generate higher per capita farm income.
Establishing independent market-supporting institutions will allow those 
affected by problems to address them as they arise.  In addition, the path 
taken by policymakers in China will affect the distribution of the economic 46
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value of production.  With interventionist policies, local leaders and their 
agents in Government-invested businesses will want a portion of the 
economic returns as compensation for their efforts, dulling the incentives 
for producers and other businesses to respond effectively.  Modern market-
supporting institutions, on the other hand, will provide more opportunities for 
producers or more efﬁ  cient processors and traders to organize themselves and 
directly reap the beneﬁ  ts of these actions.
The economic and agricultural production growth China has achieved thus 
far has been relatively easy to produce by establishing incentives, market-
based trading, and allowing regional specialization.  In order to achieve 
further growth, China will need to confront the more difﬁ  cult issues outlined 
in this report.  China’s ofﬁ  cials recognize many of these issues and are exper-
imenting with many innovative policies, reforms, and plans.  While many 
policies remain interventionist and were established by bureaucratic decree, 
China is tentatively increasing the authority and activity of the courts and the 
sanctity of laws passed by the National People’s Congress, strengthening and 
clarifying property rights, establishing a land registration system, and experi-
menting with water rights trading.  Reforms are evolutionary and exploratory 
rather than revolutionary.  Continued movement to establish these institutions 
bodes well for China’s ability to guide itself through the more complex issues 
that face such a large, diverse, and rapidly developing economy.   47
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